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I.

INTRODUCTION

On Saturday, April27, 2013, The Center for Inquiry Institute held a
symposium in Washington, D.C. on the topic, Why Tolerate
Religion?' The topic was a reference to Brian Leiter's 2013 book by
the same title. 2 This symposium was something of a coming out
party culturally for a debate that had been ongoing in the legal
academy for some time-the debate often denominated, is religion
specia/?3 The Center for Inquiry Institute is an important institution
in the growing secular cohort of American society. The holding of
this symposium meant that the challenge to the uniqueness of religion

I.

2.
3.

*Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law. This paper was prepared
with support from the Duquesne Summer Research Writing Program. My thanks to
my research assistants, Kevin Lorello and Kyle Thomas, for their assistance during
the preparation of this article.
Center for Inquiry Symposium: Why Tolerate Religion? (Apr. 27, 2013) [hereinafter
CFI
Symposium]
(symposium
program
may
be
viewed
at
http://action.centerforinquiry .net/site/Calendar?id= 10330 1&view=Detail).
BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2013).
See Jane Rutherford, Religion, Rationality, and Special Treatment, 9 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 303, 319 (200 1).
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in America would move from academic discussion to political and
social struggle.
On one level, the question raised at the symposium was one of
fairness. Why should religious believers receive exemption from
generally applicable laws that impinge on religious practice and
belief when nonbelievers would not receive the same protection in
similar circumstances? This is how the fairness issue was framed in
information about the symposium:
Should a corporation operated by religious believers
be exempt from a federal rule mandating contraceptive
coverage for employees, while an organization run by
nonreligious persons is not? Should an employee who
objects to performing certain tasks on the basis of their
religion be accommodated, while objections by a
nonreligious employee are ignored?
Should a
religious organization receiving government funding
be allowed to hire only adherents of their particular
worldview, while a secularist organization cannot do
the same?4
It might be imagined that the point of this fairness issue is to

expand exemptions for conscience so that persons not affiliated with
organized religion would be protected. As the cases litigating
possible religious exemption from the contraception mandate in the
Affordable Care Act go forward, 5 such an expansion of exemptions
from religion specifically to conscience generally could change the
current political landscape. It might help create new political
coalitions between religious believers and nonbelievers.
But this impression that the issue is that of expanding exemptions
would be mistaken. As the information about the symposium went
on to make clear, the end result, and perhaps the goal, of raising the
fairness issue is actually to restrict all conscience exemptions,
including religious ones, in American law.
Leiter contends that the reasons for tolerating religion are not
specific to religion, and instead apply to all claims of conscienceand that governments are not required to grant exemptions
4.
5.

See CFI Symposium, supra note 1.
According to The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, as of Summer 2013, there are
over sixty-seven cases and over two hundred plaintiffs challenging the contraception
mandate in one form or another. HHS Mandate Information Central, THE BECKET
FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral (last
visited Dec. 20, 20 13).
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of any kind, religious or otherwise, from laws that promote the
general welfare. 6
This restriction on exemptions from generally applicable laws,
which would be viewed by many religious believers as an assault on
religious liberty disguised as a protection for secular conscience,
would come as no surprise to participants in the ongoing is religion
special? debate. 7 That debate has assumed on both sides that religion
will continue to enjoy protection in public policy and in law as
religion only if religion is regarded as special. 8 The two sides in this
debate have shared the starting point that religion is unique and can
be distinguished from philosophical or other deep secular
commitments. The two sides differ not as to whether religion is
unique, but as to whether religion is ·especially valuable when
compared to other forms of conscience. 9
This paper aims to change the terms of this debate about religion. I
agree with Leiter that religion understood in some formal and
organizational sense is not special compared to other forms of
conscientious commitment, that is, not especially valuable. But I
disagree both with Leiter and most of the participants in this debate,
on both sides, that religion is unique.
Religion cannot be
distinguished from certain forms of philosophical or other deep
commitments practiced by persons who are not members of
organized religion and who may not consider themselves to be
religious. No attempt to distinguish conscientious believers and
conscientious nonbelievers should be made.
The effect of this change from understanding religion as unique to
seeing religious conscience and nonreligious conscience as one
continuum would be to expand the reach of religious exemptions in
law rather than to subsume religious exemptions into conscience
exemption clauses. But this expansion would not have the effect of
negating the effectiveness of such clauses. In other words, the
expansion in exemptions that I propose would not be so vast as to
require that there be no, or almost no, exemptions at all from
generally applicable laws.
The model for this expansion in
interpreting religious exemptions is the Vietnam era draft cases, in

6.
7.
8.
9.

LEITER, supra note 2, at 101.
See Rutherford, supra note 3, at 319.
See id. at 323.
See Chad Flanders, The Possibility of a Secular First Amendment, 26
REv. 257,293 (2008).
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which nonreligious conscience was treated by the Supreme Court as
basically identical to religious conscience. 10
Because the equal value of religious conscience and nonreligious
conscience becomes, in Leiter's treatment, a reason for restricting the
reach of exemptions from generally applicable laws, and because this
restriction applies primarily to traditionally religious claims, I call his
position the Anti-Religion Equality Project. And, for opposite
reasons, I call my position the Pro-Religion Equality Project, since I
propose retaining traditional protections for religious belief and
practice and expanding them to beliefs that are not traditionally
considered religious.
The article proceeds in Part I to set forth Leiter's position, in Part
II, to place his argument within the context of the ongoing debate in
American law and society over the special place of religion, and in
Part III, to evaluate Leiter's project. In my view, Leiter fails to
defme religion convincingly, but, surprisingly, I also conclude that
this failure is not central to his position. This conclusion leads me, in
Part IV to propose the Pro-Religion Equality Project. Part V
describes the Vietnam War draft cases, United States v. Seeger, 11
Welsh v. United States, 12 and Gillette v. United States 13 as illustrative
of the Pro-Religion Equality Project in practice. In Part VI, I explore
the difficulties that arise from conscience clauses in the context of
exemptions from mandatory vaccination laws and suggest that the
expansion of religious exemptions in that context would be a much
better policy. In Part VII, I set forth some objections to the
expansion of religious exemptions as an alternative to conscience
clauses. Part VIII explores the implications of the Pro-Religion
Equality Project for healing some of our divisions over religion and
nonbelief. Finally, my conclusion suggests that the easy assumption
of secularity that nonbelievers make may mask the difficult task of
creating a flourishing secular civilization, including a role for serious
spiritual seeking in secularism.
As will become clear, this article does not really aim at solving the
legal problem of the proper interpretation of religious exemption
provisions. This article does not even discuss the difference between
religious exemptions that are absolute, as in the draft cases, and the
balancing tests in free exercise and religious liberty statutory
exemption challenges, such as that of the Religious Freedom

10.
II.
12.
13.

See infra Part V.

380 U.S. 163 (1965).
398 u.s. 333 (1970).
401 u.s. 437 (1971).
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Restoration Act (RFRA). 14 Rather, my concern is the growing divide
in America between believers and nonbelievers. It is my hope that
the recognition that those who practice traditional religions share
similar beliefs with many of those who do not, will lead to
reconciliation and a reduction in the enmity that currently
characterizes American life.
II. WHY TOLERATE RELIGION?
The argument in Leiter's book is made in simple and
straightforward fashion. The main point Leiter argues is that there is
no "credible principled argument for tolerating religion qua religion .
15
• • •"
In Chapter 1, Leiter sets forth the moral and ep1stemic cases
for principled toleration, primarily by the state, of private choices and
conscientious commitments in general in the absence of harm to
others or a threat to social order. 16 These arguments are, and are
meant to be seen as, philosophically traditional. 17 The moral
arguments are said to be typically Kantian or utilitarian. 18 The moral
arguments "claim either that there is a right to the liberty to hold the
beliefs and engage in the practices of which toleration is required; or
that toleration of those beliefs and practices is essential to the
realization of morally important goods." 19 The epistemic arguments
for toleration emphasize, instead, "the contribution that tolerance
makes to knowledge." 20
The reader should note that principled toleration for Leiter does not
demand very much of the state. The state may not suppress
conscientious beliefs and may not select conscientious practices in
particular for legal sanction, but that essentially exhausts the state's
obligation. 21 The limits on toleration, which Leiter refers to as sideconstraints,22 and which he asserts impact mostly on conscientious
practices rather than beliefs, include preventing damage to the public
order and other forms ofharm. 23

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

20.
21.
22.
23.

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006).
LEITER, supra note 2, at 7.
See id. at 7-8, 10, 15.
See id. at 8, 10.
See id. at 15.
/d.
/d. at 19.
See id. at 63.
!d. at 21.
See id. at 22-23.
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Leiter does not expressly defme what he means by conscientious
commitments, either in Chapter 1 or anywhere else in the book. He
suggests at one point, however, a very broad understanding of
conscience as "being able to choose what to believe and how to
live." 24 Later in the book, conscience will be described as something
narrower, as something much more serious and imperative? 5
Since Leiter is going to argue that religious conscience as a
category does not deserve any greater legal protection or social
acknowledgment than secular conscience, he sees it as necessary, in
Chapter 2, to define religion as a unique realm. 26 Referring to the
work of John Witte, Leiter denies that religion is a unique source of
individual and personal identity. 27 But he agrees with Witte that the
concept of owing a duty to our Creator, while not literally present in
every religion, does distinguish religion in terms of the "normativity
of (at least some) religious commands ...." 28 Drawing on the work
of Timothy Macklem, Leiter states that religious belief is based on
faith rather than reason. 29
Leiter concludes from these sources that for all religions, there are
at least some central beliefs:
1. issue in categorical demands on action-that is,
demands that must be satisfied no matter what an
individual's antecedent desires and no matter what
incentives or disincentives the world offers up; and
2. do not answer ultimately (or at the limit) to
evidence and reasons, as these are understood in other
domains concerned with knowledge of the world.
Religious beliefs, in virtue ofbeing based on "faith,"
are insulated from ordinary standards of evidence and
rational justification, the ones we employ use both
common sense and science.30
Leiter then proceeds in Chapter 2 to test out these two criteria in
terms of possible under inclusiveness and over inclusiveness. 31 In
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

/d. at 17-18.
!d. at 95; see infra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
LEITER, supra note 2, at 4-7, 31-35.
/d. at 32-33.
/d. at 33.
!d. at 31.
/d. at 33-34.
/d. at 46.
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terms of under inclusiveness, Leiter is asking whether any traditions
generally regarded as religious are excluded by his definitions. 32
Leiter concludes that both Buddhism and certain "intellectualist"
strains of Christianity, though purporting to be based on reason, still
fit his definition of religion. 33 In terms of over inclusiveness, Leiter
concludes that Marxism and morality in general, though clearly
issuing in categorical demands, are not insulated from evidence and
reason in the same sense as is religion. 34 In the course of this
discussion, Leiter discards a possible third criterion of religion-that
it "involve, explicitly or implicitly, a metaphysics of ultimate
reality." 35 This quality, Leiter believes, is already captured by
religion's insulation from evidence. 36 In order to distinguish religion
more sharply from morality, however, Leiter adds another distinction:
that there are some beliefs in religion that "render intelligible and
tolerable the basic existential facts about human life, such as
suffering and death.'m
Having now defmed religion and religious belief, Leiter proceeds
in Chapter 3 to ask whether religion, understood in this way, deserves
special protection in law and special acknowledgment from society. 38
His answer is no because, in terms of moral reasons, there is no
greater right to religious conscience than to any other form of
conscience (we would not distinguish religious conscience from
liberty of conscience in Rawls's original position, for example), and
because religious beliefs, since they are insulated from reason and
evidence, are not any more likely to give us knowledge than
conscientious beliefs of any other kind. 39 Of course, religious beliefs
and practices deserve toleration, but that is because they involve
matters of conscience, not because they involve matters of religion. 40
At this point in Chapter 3, Leiter explores a concrete case of
claimed religious exemption from generally applicable law. 41 The
concrete instance is one of a male believer in the Sikh religion who
must wear a ceremonial dagger or sword and who runs afoul of a law

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See id. at 42.
Id. at 40, 45-46.
Id. at 38, 49-50.
Id. at 47.
Id.
Id. at 52.
Id. at61.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 64.
Id.
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banning weapons in public schools.42 Leiter begins his book with a
contrast between this fourteen-year-old Sikh boy and a boy from a
rural family whose family tradition entails the passing of a dagger or
knife from father to son across the generations.43 In the Introduction,
the contrast of the two instances is meant to raise the question of
religious exemptions from general law versus nonreligious
exemptions from generallaw. 44
But in Chapter 3, Leiter raises the issue of the religious exemption
for a different purpose. Here the point is that an exemption of any
kind from a generally applicable law should not be granted if it
causes harm to others. 45 Leiter criticizes the Canadian Supreme
Court case that permitted the Sikh child to carry the ceremonial
knife. 46 In Leiter's view, the school setting should not have been
distinguished from the contexts of courtrooms and airplanes, where
no accommodations for ceremonial weapons are permitted. 47
This discussion in Chapter 3 illustrates an ambiguity that afflicts
the entire book. As explained above, principled toleration for Leiter
is always limited by the harm principle.48 This has nothing to do with
exemptions, religious or otherwise, from generally applicable laws.
If toleration is not demanded because a particular religious practice
threatens harm, then not only should there be no exemption for such a
practice, but the practice itself should be banned. For example,
religious human sacrifice could be specifically banned, along with
homicide in general, on the theory that if there is a religion widely
practiced that encourages human sacrifice, countering that
encouragement would justify banning human sacrifice per se.49
It should follow then that if there is a law banning some particular
act as dangerous in general, such as a ban on weapons in school,
toleration would never require, or even permit, a religious or
conscience exemption from that law. For such an exemption would
by definition run afoul of the harm principle.
The ambiguity lies in the fact that Leiter never explains the level of
generality at which the harm principle operates. Clearly, laws
banning weapons in school are justified by the harm principle and
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

!d.
!d. at 1-2.
See id. at 3.
See id. at 62--63.
!d. at 64--65 (criticizing Mu1tani v. Comm'n sco1aire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] 1
S.C.R. 256 (Can.)).
!d. at 65.
See id. at 21-23, 62--69.
See id. at 66. This is my example rather than Leiter's, but it follows from his views.
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serve the common good. But, just as clearly, practitioners of the Sikh
religion who have ceremonial daggers pose no real threat at all to
public order. So, aside from the concern about a child who only
claims to be a sincere devotee of the Sikh religion, or aside from the
highly unlikely event that a Sikh schoolchild becomes deranged,
there is no way to decide whether the harm principle prohibits an
exemption to the no weapons policy or not. But Leiter condemns the
exemption without resolving how these judgments should be made,
or even which party, the believer or the state, should have the burden
of proof that no danger ofharm is present in this one instance. 50
In Chapter 4, Leiter rejects the argument by Martha Nussbaum,
who undoubtedly speaks for many in her book Liberty of
Conscience, 51 that religion is entitled to more than mere tolerationthat religion is entitled to respect. 52 Leiter argues that religion is
entitled to minimal respect, but not to any affirmative concept of
respect, and that minimal respect is not much different from
religion's right to toleration. 53 Leiter concludes that since religion is
insulated from ordinary standards of reason and evidence, religion is
culpable false belief: that is, religious believers hold beliefs that are
unwarranted and which they ought to know are unwarranted. 54
Efforts by apologists for religion, such as William Alston and Alvin
Plantinga, to show that religion is rational are simply efforts to justify
insulation of religious faith from ordinary standards of reason and
evidence in common sense and the sciences. 55
Not only are religious beliefs likely to be false, but since they are
also often issue in categorical demands, we can assume that they are
especially likely to cause harm to others. Leiter admits that religious
belief has often also led to impressive defenses of human rights when
most others have been silent. 56 Nevertheless, the track record of
religion is too mixed to rely on this occasional heroic phenomenon.

50.

51.
52.
53.
54.

55.
56.

See id. at 110-15. Perhaps it will prove to be the case, for example, that any
exemption will raise impossible proof issues or will be impossible to limit
appropriately. But these problems must be shown, which is what I refer to as the
burden of proof that Leiter ignores.
!d. at 68; MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA'S
TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY (2008).
LEITER, supra note 2, at 68.
Id. at 69.
See id. at 77-81.
/d. at 81.
E.g., id. at 36.
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Nor does Leiter agree with John Finnis that religion contains more
truth about reality than can any atheism. 57 Finnis is referring to the
Thomist concept of the norm of rationality-that there is a reason
beyond chance or necessity why things are as they are-which,
Finnis argues, guides all rational inquiry, including that of science. 58
Leiter denies that an "explanatory reason," in the sense of such
causation or telos, is essential to rational inquiry. 59 Thus, religion,
like any realm of conscience, is entitled to toleration but not to
respect.
In Chapter 5, entitled broadly The Law of Religious Liberty in a
Tolerant Society, Leiter attempts to provide a big picture of the
proper overall treatment of religious liberty in a liberal society. 60 But
it quickly becomes apparent that Leiter will not actually develop any
broad approach that would set forth standards for when exemptions
for conscience, religious and secular, from neutral laws should be
granted.
Instead, it turns out that Leiter's concern is to bring a prior
inconsistency into alignment. 61 Leiter believes that he has shown that
liberty of conscience should be protected "under the rubric of
principled toleration."62 He believes that he has also shown that there
is no principled reason to grant religious conscience any greater legal
protection than nonreligious conscience. 63 The problem Leiter
focuses on is that, on the one hand, "liberty of conscience generally is
morally important," but under "extant law" religious liberty is treated
as more important than liberty of conscience generally-in America
in a de jure fashion and in every other Western democracy in a de
facto fashion. 64 Leiter believes that his proposed adjustment in the
balance of religious and nonreligious conscience will play out over
the issue of exemptions from generally applicable laws. 65
Of course, by this formulation the reader has no way to know
whether Leiter believes that religious liberty is now receiving the
theoretically proper level of protection and other forms of conscience
simply need to be protected to a greater extent, or whether Leiter

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

/d. at 86-87.
/d. at 87-88.
See id. at 88-89.
See id. at 92-133 (arguing that liberal societies should not grant religious
exemptions).
See id. at 93, 132-33.
!d. at 92.
!d. at 92-93.
/d.
/d. at 93.
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believes that the protection of religious liberty is too strong and needs
to be reduced, or whether some combination of increase and
reduction will be Leiter's goal.
Because he is not really designing a general regime of liberty,
Leiter never specifies the attributes of conscience that might justify
an exemption from a generally applicable law. The two examples of
conscience claims that Leiter previously set forth-that of the Sikh
boy under whose tradition a ceremonial knife must be carried into
school and the rural boy whose familial traditions entail a similar
demand66--describe well-established practices. The reader might
conclude, therefore, that conscience, to be recognized, must be
objectively identifiable by some kind of communal custom. Leiter
quickly excludes that possibility by including the example of the
"lone eccentric, who for reasons known only to him, feels a
categorical compulsion, with which he deeply identifies as a matter
of personal integrity, to always have a knife nearby . . . ."67
Conscience, for Leiter, is potentially an individual matter. 68 He notes
that perhaps Thoreau was such a lone eccentric. 69
Leiter's hostility toward conscience exemptions only becomes
apparent when he begins his discussion of liberty of conscience with
an echo of Justice Scalia's position in Employment Division v.
Smith 10-that to recognize a universal exemption for conscience
would "appear to amount to a legalization of anarchy!" 71 He first
addresses the evidentiary problem in evaluating claims of
conscience. 72 Leiter asserts now, for the first time, that a valid claim
of conscience must be "a kind of moral imperative central to one's
integrity as a person, to the meaning of one's life." 73 Therefore, a

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

71.

72.
73.

!d. at 1-2.
!d. at 93.
See id. at 95.
!d. at 160 n.l.
Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by
statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat.
1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)).
LEITER, supra note 2, at 94. The exclamation point belongs to Leiter and he does not
refer to Justice Scalia's opinion that "[a]ny society adopting such a system would be
courting anarchy, but that danger increases in direct proportion to the society's
diversity of religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress none of
them." Smith, 494 U.S. at 888. Justice Scalia, in context, was criticizing a robust
application of the compelling state interest test to claims of religious exemption,
which is similar to the objection Leiter is raising.
LEITER, supra note 2, at 94.
!d. at 95.
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legal system must have a way to distinguish claims of conscience
from other sorts of objections to law, such as self-interest. 74 Leiter
admits that limiting conscience exemptions to the category of religion
grants an evidentiary advantage in this regard because a religious
claimant must at least reference a religion. 75
One way to deal with this evidentiary problem might be to limit
claims of conscience to communal traditions that mimic the practices
of religious groups. The example that Leiter gives is the "vegan
prisoner" who is a member of the "animal liberation movement. "76
Leiter concludes that the problem with this kind of compromise is
that it treats different kinds of claims of conscience unequally in a
context in which the unequal treatment is not justified except by
pragmatic reasons of proof. 77
Leiter at this point introduces an objection to universal exemptions
for conscience that he believes goes beyond evidentiary problems and
even equality problems. 78 Exemptions from generally applicable
laws often impose burdens on others, whether these others are ones
who must take up the slack, as in the case of conscientious objection
to military duty, or are ones who must deal with the consequences of
the objection, as in the taxpayers and kitchen staff who must deal
with food exemptions in prison. 79
Leiter states that, in a circumstance in which general compliance
with laws is necessary to promote the "common good," any scheme
of exemptions from those laws is "morally objectionable." 80 Leiter
gives examples of laws that promote the general welfare and thus for
him ground a moral objection to any exemptions: zoning regulations,
mandatory vaccination laws and a weapons ban in schools. 81 And he
gives examples of exemptions that he says do not necessarily raise
this moral objection: the right to wear religious clothing and to use
certain illegal narcotics in religious rituals. 82
Despite Leiter's statements to the contrary, Leiter is not
distinguishing here among different kinds of laws. All of these laws
promote the common good. Rather, he is distinguishing among
exemptions from law based on which exemptions impose burdens on
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

!d.
!d.
!d. at 96-97.
See id. at 98.
!d. at 98-99.
!d. at 99.
!d.
!d. at 99-100.
!d. at 100.
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others. Placing a burden on others seems to be what he means by the
moral objection to a universal scheme of exemptions from law. But
it is not clear why and in what sense an exemption from a zoning
regulation always imposes such a burden on others, while an
exemption for drug use never does.
Leiter then suggests, as a potential rule, that there be no exemptions
from generally applicable laws, "except when no burden-shifting is
involved." 83 Again, Leiter has not explained why there should ever
be exemptions from laws that serve the general welfare, even when
there is no burden shifting involved. He states in a footnote that one
reason to accept exemptions at all is a kind of moral realism about
rights, which as a "moral skeptic" he does not share. 84 Leiter admits
that he cannot be certain that the majority's vision of morality is more
reliable than that of the individual conscience objector. 85 This seems
to me to be a crucial problem for him, but at this point Leiter simply
stops. 86 The discussion in the book just goes back and forth, without
explanation, from a proposed regime of no exemptions unless there
are no burdens to others to a regime of no exemptions at all. 87
Leiter acknowledges that a rule of no exemptions in practice will
burden minority claims of conscience, religious or otherwise, since
laws enacted by the majority will presumably not impinge on
mainstream conscientious objection. 88 Leiter also admits that some
religious practices, such as charitable activities, are entitled to more
than mere toleration, and thus, may be granted exemptions from
certain laws, such as is the case with tax exempt organizations. 89 But
religious conscience in general is entitled only to toleration.
Leiter reminds the reader that while a rule of no exemptions from
laws that promote the general welfare is justified under principled
toleration, state hostility to religious practices per se violates

83.
84.
85.

86.
87.
88.

89.

/d. at 101.
/d. at 163 n.12.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 103-04 (referencing a regime of "no exemptions for burden-shifting claims
of conscience").
/d. at 101-Q2. The experience of the Affordable Care Act litigation gives pause here
since the objectors to the contraception mandate include very mainstream Roman
Catholic and other Christian objectors. Perhaps we are entering a time in which the
logic of the culture wars will drive secular policymakers increasingly to challenge
traditional religious positions. This may prove to be the case with the legalization of
gay marriage, as another example.
/d. at 103.
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principled toleration. 90 In Leiter's view, the French ban on religious
clothing in public schools is an instance of intolerance rather than an
instance of the rule of no exemptions. 91 The difference between the
two is not just that the French ban seems to be motivated by antiIslamic bias. 92 That kind of forbidden animus could, in principle, be
proved and religious practitioners protected by the courts. 93 The
reason that the French ban on headscarves is intolerant is that any
claim of harm from such religious clothing is speculative and
unlikely to be empirically vindicated. 94 After all, the harm claimed in
defense of the ban is not the risk of physical assault or other forms of
harassment, but only the promotion of the "moral ideal of equal
citizenship. " 95
It is not obvious why the threat to this moral ideal posed by
religious garb in public schools is not a real harm that the French are
entitled to prohibit under principled toleration. It is clear that Leiter
wishes to distinguish laws that are in some way aimed against
practices of conscience from laws with neutral objectives. 96 The
former laws are generally unjustified. The latter laws are not only
justified themselves, they are justified even if they do not provide
exemptions for conscience. The difference between the two has to do
with the kinds of goods that the state may legitimately promote.
Leiter takes strong exception to the Rawlsian view that the state
may not endorse a substantive vision of the good. 97 Leiter considers
such endorsement not only proper but inevitable by any state. 98 But
there are no visions of the good that are acceptable to everyone.
Undoubtedly, such state endorsement is in a sense a burden on the
consciences of the dissenters, but the dissenters have no moral claim
to exemption from laws expressing the state's vision of the good.
The closest that Leiter comes to enunciating a general statement
about the role of conscience, including religion, in terms of the goods
pursued in a liberal state is that, consistent with principled toleration,
the state may endorse a conception of the good that conflicts with the
claims of conscience of some of its citizens as long as its objective is

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

!d. at 103-04.
/d. at 104-05.
/d. at 105-07.
See id. at 107.
/d. at 114.
!d. at 113.
!d. at 114.
!d. at 108.
See id. at II 7.
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not to suppress or coercively burden those claims of conscience, but
to serve the state's conception of the good. 99
Leiter must walk a fine line here. In his view, principled toleration
is equally compatible with an established church or with
disestablishment. 100 Within the context of disestablishment, Leiter
believes that religious concerns may properly be banished from some
contexts in the public square, such as public schools. 101 Leiter argues
that the Supreme Court is mistaken in prohibiting public schools from
barring use of public facilities by religious groups. 102
The seeming inconsistency here is that the state's conception of the
good might even include a view of religion as mythology-a false
claim versus the scientific claims of evolution and geology. At first
glance, that would seem to be the situation in France. Where the
French went too far, according to Leiter, was in banning religious
expression where there was no realistic threat to the state conception
of the good as secular. 103 No threat, that is, beyond the legitimate
expression of a "different Vision of the Good." 104 But, of course, this
is conclusory. It could just as easily be asserted that the use of public
facilities by religious groups poses no realistic threat of harm either.
Finally, Leiter mentions and dismisses the ground of religious
exemptions from law premised on likely resistance by religious
believers. 105 Leiter concedes that the majority's laws may be unjust.
Religious believers, or other claimants of conscience, may be correct
to resist unjust laws. 106 Such considerations are separate, however,
from the moral justifications of exemptions from the general
requirements of law.
I have described Leiter's position at length because I will rely later
in this article on the reader's understanding of distinctions that I will
draw with regard to Leiter's views. But Leiter's arguments did not
arise in a vacuum. The context is necessary for a full evaluation of
his position.

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

/d.
/d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
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at
at
at
/d. at
!d. at
!d. at

117-18.
120-21.
123.
121.
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131-32.
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III. THE ANTI-RELIGION EQUALITY PROJECT IN CONTEXT
Leiter is arguing two separate propositions. First, he is arguing that
religious conscience is equivalent to nonreligious conscience in terms
of its value, both to the individual's conscience and to society in
some more general sense. 107 Thus, religion is not special. The
implication of this first position is that instances of nonreligious
conscience deserve the same level of legal protection as instances of
religious conscience. I call this aspect of Leiter's position, the
Equality Project, because it places religious and nonreligious
conscience in a position of equality. There is no way to tell a priori
whether conscience receives a great deal of legal protection or very
little.
Leiter's second proposition concerns the ultimate level of
protection any form of conscience should receive. The level of
protection that Leiter proposes is based on the principle of toleration,
which, since it prohibits any form of discrimination or coercion
aimed at conscience per se, would yield a high level of protection in
the context of a government hostile toward religion. 108 This is the
lesson of Leiter's condemnation of the French ban on headscarves in
public schools. 109
But in the context of a liberal regime protective generally of, or at
least not hostile to, liberty of conscience and religion, toleration
promises very little, since it does not require exemption from any
neutral law of general applicability. In practice, therefore, Leiter's
scheme perfectly replicates the balance of Employment Division v.
Smith 110 and Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 111
which, respectively, hold that the Free Exercise Clause does not
require a religious exemption from any neutral, generally applicable
law, but that the clause does usually prohibit discrimination against
religion. 112
In the context of such a limited degree of legal protection for
conscience in general, the net effect of Leiter's position, if it were
adopted, would be to reduce the level of legal protection that exists
today for religious conscience under either state constitutions, or

107.
108.
109.
110.

!d. at 133.

See id. at 105.
See id. at 104--06.
Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by
statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat.
1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)).
111. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Ave., Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
112. See id. at 529-30; Smith, 494 U.S. at 882-83.
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federal and state religious exemption statutes. 113 That is why I refer
to the equality proposed by Leiter as one that is anti-religion. Thus, I
call his position overall the Anti-Religion Equality Project.
The debate over Leiter's own Anti-Religion Equality Project has
been going on for quite some time. Leiter originally set forth his
position in a 2008 law review article. 114 Apparently, however, the
paper upon which that article was based had been circulating among
legal academics much earlier than that. 115
But if we think of the context not just in terms of Leiter's specific
arguments, but in terms of the general acceptance and honor that used
to be accorded to religion, the debate over the value of religion has
been growing for quite some time in American legal circles. 116 Prior
to Smith in 1990, the subject of hostility to religion mostly came up in
law review literature as the question about whether a particular
ruling, or rulings, by the Supreme Court manifested a forbidden
hostility toward religion in the context of interpretation of the
Establishment Clause. 117 Thus, in 1989, Mark Tushnet had difficulty
taking seriously Kent Greenawalt's concern about "[a] good many
professors and other intellectuals [who] display a hostility or
skeptical indifference to religion that amounts to a thinly disguised
contempt for belief in any reality beyond that discoverable by
scientific inquiry and ordinary human experience." 118 Tushnet
responded, "There may of course be adamant strict separationists
113. See Bruce Ledewitz, Experimenting with Religious Liberty: The Quasi-Constitutional
Status of Religious Exemptions, ELON L. REv. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 5354) (providing a general treatment of the national context for religious exemptions).
114. See generally Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 1 (2008)
(setting forth Leiter's fundamental position). The gist of chapter four was published
later, in Brian Leiter, Foundations of Religious Liberty: Toleration or Respect?, 47
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 935, 937-38 (2010).
115. See Richard W. Garnett & Joshua D. Dunlap, Taking Accommodation Seriously:
Religious Freedom and the 0 Centro Case, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 257, 279-80
(2006).
116. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
AND THE CONSTITUTION 76-77 (2007) (arguing for "equal liberty" for religious and
nonreligious commitments).
117. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Separation and the 'Secular': Reconstructing the
Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REv. 955, 958 n.l7 (1989) ("Although I am
unaware of any reputable scholar or judge who has argued that the [E]stablishment
[C]lause requires government to be actively hostile to religion, many scholars have
argued that current establishment doctrine is in fact hostile to religion in its
consequences, and perhaps in its inspiration.").
118. Mark Tushnet, Religion in Politics, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1131, 1134 (1989)(reviewing
KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988)).
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who would invalidate all laws that rested in some significant way on
religious motivations. To the extent that such people are intolerant of
those who simply hold religious views, they need not be taken
seriously." 119 Donald McConnell refers to this period as "a defacto
settlement of the balance between religious liberty and secular liberal
public policy." 120 In other words, there was a general pro-religion
consensus during this period.
Smith came as something of a shock to this context. The case was
criticized as hostile to free exercise values. 121 The immediate
response to Smith was a debate over returning to a preexisting norm
that was perceived as not having been hostile toward religion. 122
The situation today in the legal academy is very different. Paul
Horwitz describes what has happened as the collapse of a fragile
consensus. 123 The difference is certainly related, as Horwitz argues,
to larger cultural forces such as the New Atheism and to a resurgence
of the demands of religious believers to be heard in the public
square. 124 I will return to that larger, cultural context in a moment.
But if I had to name a single event that crystalized latent
ambivalence, if not hostility, toward religion in the legal academy, it
would be the scandal of sexual abuse in the Catholic Church. 125 The
most ardent expression of that hostility, revolutionary at the time in
its candor, was Marci Hamilton's 2005 book, God vs. the Gave/. 126
After the publication of Hamilton's book, it became acceptable for
American legal academics to express skepticism about the beneficent
role of religion. Religion was no longer special, at least not for
everyone.
Once the gloves were off, so to speak, the ground was prepared for
Leiter's question, Why Tolerate Religion? And, of course, there are
119. !d. at 1135.
120. Donald R. McConnell, Is Modern Legal Liberalism Still Compatible with Free
Exercise of Religion?, 33 CAMPBELL L. REv. 641, 643 (2011).
121. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L.
REv. 671,681-82,687-91 (1992).
122. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Should Congress Pass Legislation Restoring the
Broader Interpretation of Free Exercise of Religion?, 15 HARV. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y
181, 183-88 (1992).
123. PAUL HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE: LAW, RELIGION, AND THE CONSTITUTION 3-4
(2011).
124. !d. at 22-30.
125. For a description of the scandal and the early response of the Church, see NICHOLAS P.
CAFARO!, BEFORE DALLAS: THE U.S. BISHOPS' RESPONSE TO CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE
OF CHILDREN (2008).
126. MARCIA. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW 3, 5-6
(2005).
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religious 127 and nonreligious 128 defenses ofthe uniqueness of religious
liberty in response to Leiter.
In terms of the cultural forces that Horwitz describes, one can see
the growing divide between believers and nonbelievers, certainly
since the beginning of the twenty-first century. 129 One obvious
starting point is the New Atheist attack on religion that gained
momentum during the early years of the twenty-first century. 130 That
loose movement of Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, Daniel Dennett,
and Christopher Hitchens, among others, raised no new arguments
against God's existence, but did set the stage for the emergence of a
mass anti-religious movement for the first time in America. 131 The
culmination of the New Atheist movement was Hitchens' best-seller,
God is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything, originally
published in 2007. 132 That book made clear that the object of attack
by the New Atheism was religion in general and not just belief in
God per se. 133 Shortly before his death in 2011, Hitchens expressed
this view in an interview in The New Statesman with Richard
Dawkins:
The totalitarian, to me, is the enemy - the one that's
absolute, the one that wants control over the inside of your
head, not just your actions and your taxes. And the
origins of that are theocratic, obviously. The beginning of
that is the idea that there is a supreme leader, or infallible

127.

128.
129.
130.
131.

132.
133.

See, e.g., E. Gregory Wallace, Justifying Religious Freedom: The Western Tradition,
114 PENN ST. L. REv. 485, 491 (2009) ("My thesis is that the First Amendment's
protection of religious freedom must rest preeminently on the intrinsic character and
claims of religion itself. Religion requires special constitutional treatment precisely
because it involves something transcendent, objective, normative, and exclusive.").
See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Sex, Atheism, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 88 U.
DET. MERCY L. REv. 407, 430 (2011).
HORWITZ, supra note 123, at xiii-xviii.
!d. at xiii-xiv.
For general critical accounts of this rise, see TINA BEATTIE, THE NEW ATHEISTS: THE
TWILIGHT OF REASON AND THE WAR ON RELIGION (2007) and JOHN F. HAUGHT, GOD
AND THE NEW ATHEISM: A CRITICAL RESPONSE TO DAWKINS, HARRIS AND HITCHENS
(2008).
CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, GOD IS NOT GREAT: HOW RELIGION POISONS EVERYTHING
(2007).
See id. at 17.
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pope, or a chief rabbi, or whatever, who can ventriloquise
the divine and tell us what to do. 134
God is just the chief totalitarian, among other totalitarians.
This criticism of religious faith as unthinking was the theme of
another cultural marker of the growing distance between believers
and nonbelievers-the Reason Rally held on March 24, 2012 in
Washington D.C. 135 While in part an unapologetic declaration of
presence on the American stage-"secularism is coming out of the
closet" stated the Reason Rally homepage 136-and while assuring the
public that it was not the point of the rally to "trash religion," 137 what
else is a reason rally other than a celebration of reason associated
Religion
with the secular and not associated with religion?
presumably functions by reliance on sources other than reason--<>n
tradition, for example. As the late Paul Kurtz, who popularized the
term "secular humanism" put it, "[m]odem physics and astronomy
began by stepping outside religious authority." 138
David Niose, president of the American Humanist Association,
while maintaining that nonbelievers do not claim a "monopoly on
rationality," 139 nevertheless described the rally as celebrating those
who use reason, in an op-ed published the day before. 140 The piece
touted a political realignment in view of the overwhelming political
success of religious conservatives and the strong support that
nonbelievers routinely deliver to the Democratic Party: "[f]or over
three decades, political debates in America have often centered on the
issue of appeasing religious conservatives . . . . [L ]ittle harm could

134.

135.

136.

George Eaton, Preview: Richard Dawkins Interviews Christopher Hitchens, THE NEW
STATESMAN (Dec. 13, 2011, 2:11 PM), http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/thestaggers/20 11/12/dawkins-hitchens-catholic.
See Press Release, Reason Rally Marks Turning Point for Secular Movement,
American Politics, REASONRALLY I (Mar. 22, 20 12), http://reasonrally.org/wpcontent/uploads/20 11 /09/Reason-Rally-Marks-Turning-Point-for. pdf.
The Reason Rally: A Celebration of Secular Values, REASONRALLY.ORG,
http://reasonrally.org/about/ (last visited Dec. 20, 20 13).

137. !d.
138. PAUL KURTZ, THE TURBULENT UNIVERSE 20 (2013).
139. David Niose, Op-Ed., The Rise of the Secular Political Movement, PITTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE
(Mar.
23,
2013
12:00
AM),
http://www.postgazette.com/stories/opinionlperspectives/the-rise-of-the-secular-political-movement627720/.
140. See id.
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come from making room at the table for a segment of the population
that centers its world view on critical thinking and reason." 141
Obviously, this formulation is meant to contrast nonbelievers with
others who do not center their worldview on critical thinking and
reason. Leiter participates in this division.
Another recent cultural marker of the increasing distance between
believers and nonbelievers was the anti-religion billboard campaign
in the spring of 2012 mounted by American Atheists and other
groups. 142 Here is how the editors of the online magazine Religion
Dispatches described the campaign: "This spring, billboards sprouted
across the country like cranky, God-hating daffodils.
They
proclaimed the bad news that God does not exist, that belief is bad for
your soul, that religion enslaves .... " 143
Anthony Pinn, Professor of Religious Studies at Rice University,
described what the campaign aimed at: "Billboards, rallies, biting
commentary-all this is meant to deconstruct the cultural worlds
framing sacred texts and ideas, and to do deep damage to the
stronghold religion has on life in the United States." 144
Aside from the attack on religion and belief-in-God, there has been
another, and even more significant, recent manifestation of secular
animosity against religion. In a variety of contexts, religion has been
challenged as discriminatory. 145
Part of this narrative of
discrimination arises from the opposition of much of American

Id.
See Ben Yakas, See Monday's Controversial Anti-Religion Billboard, Today!,
GOTHAMIST (Mar. 1, 2012,5:21 PM),
http:/Igothamist.com/20 12/03/01 /see_mondays_controversial_anti -reli.php.
143. Anthony B. Pinn, Can Atheist Billboards Kill Religion?, RELIGION DISPATCHES
(May 1, 2012),
http://www.religiondispatches.org/archive/atheologies/5823/can_atheist_billboards_ki
ll_religion/.
144. Id.
145. See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971,2994-95 (2010); Catherine
Poe, Contraception Battle: Not a War on Religion, But a War on Women, WASH.
TIMES (Feb. 10, 2012), http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/adlib/2012/feb/10/contraception-battle-not-war-religion-war-women/; Hunter Stuart,
Alabama Government Agency Holds Prayer Against Abortion, Gay Marriage,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jul. 23, 2013, 11 :4 7 AM),
http://www .huffmgtonpost.com/20 13/07/25/alabama-prayer-gaymarriage_n_3651756.htrnl; Vanderbilt University Policy Forces Catholic Group Off
Campus, CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (Mar. 29,2012, 12:07 AM),
http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/vanderbilt-university-policy-forcescatholic-group-off-campus/.

141.
142.
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organized religion against gay marriage and abortion. 146 Part of this
narrative comes from the fight over the contraception mandate in the
Affordable Care Act. 147 Catherine Poe called the mostly religious
opposition to that mandate a "war on women" on the Washington
Times blog. 148 That phrase is not uncommon among nonbelievers
these days.
Perhaps the strangest aspect of the association of religion with
discrimination is the fight over membership in religious organizations
on college campuses. In Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 149 the
United States Supreme Court held that Hastings Law School could
condition official recognition of a student group on the group's
willingness to embrace an all-comers policy-that membership and
leadership in the group would be open to all students. 150 This
precedent could lead to a wave of disaffiliations by religious campus
groups. In March 2012, for example, Vanderbilt University forced a
Catholic student group off campus when the group would not rescind
a requirement that its leaders be Catholic. 151 I call this strange
because it seems absurd to me that student groups are criticized
because they insist on some kind of common commitment for a
group-as if the Young Democrats are being close-minded if they
insist on the leader of their group having a formal affiliation with the
Democratic Party in order to be a leader of their group.
Religious leaders have responded to, or even preempted, these
challenges by nonbelievers in a variety of ways that are themselves
increasingly combative. At a meeting sponsored by the Ethics and
Public Policy Center's American Religious Freedom Program in May
2012, for example, Richard Land, who heads the Southern Baptist
Convention's Ethics & Religion Liberty Commission, described
secular hostility to religion in fundamental political/theological
terms: "Secularists don't like people of faith because the ultimate
authority for us is not the state. The ultimate authority is God." 152

146.
147.
148.
149.

See, e.g., Stuart, supra note 145.
See Poe, supra note 145.
/d.
Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coli. of the Law v.
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
150. /d. at 2994-95.
151. See Vanderbilt University Policy Forces Catholic Group Off Campus, supra note 145.
152. The Motley Monk, The Obama Administration's Attack on Religious Freedom, THE
AMERICAN
CATHOLIC
(May
25,
2012),
http://the-americancatholic.com/2012/05/25/the-obama-administrations-attack-on-religious-freedom-thesecond-vatican-councils-spirit-of-ecumenism-at-work/.
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The main response by believers, and in fact the subject of the May
meeting, has been to assert that religious liberty in the United States
is under threat and to cite some of the contexts of the attacks by
nonbelievers as evidence of that threat. 153 So, pressure on clergy to
cooperate with gay marriage, pressure on religious campus groups to
open membership, pressure on believers to participate in providing
abortion services, pressure on religious organizations to cooperate in
certain forms of law enforcement, and so forth, are all cited as threats
against religious believers-as is the general attitude among
nonbelievers that religion is a negative social phenomenon.
The U.S. Catholic bishops have been the most vocal and dramatic
religious voice of opposition. The bishops urged Catholics and "all
people of faith" to observe March 30, 2012 as a day of prayer and
fasting for religious freedom. 154 Undoubtedly, the reason the bishops
took the lead is that the contraception mandate that is part of the
Affordable Care Act does not present a direct threat to the teachings
of most Protestant denominations. Nevertheless, the same general
tenor has now been adopted by the leadership of many-though
certainly not all-religious groups in America.
An aspect of all this rhetoric was undoubtedly the pressure of a
Presidential re-election campaign that was regarded by many as a
potential watershed event in terms of the long-term health of religious
liberty in America. 155 Certainly, since the November 2012 election,
the rhetoric on both sides has not been as heated. Nevertheless, the
litigation over the contraception mandate is continuing 156 and will
/d.
See U.S. Bishops Set March 30 as Day ofPrayer, Fasting for Religious Liberty,
CATHOLIC SENTINEL,
http://www.catholicsentinel.org/main.asp?SectioniD=2&SubSectionlD=34&ArticleiD
= 17772 (last visited Dec. 20, 20 13) ("The bishops announced the day long observance
in a statement titled 'United for Religious Freedom' that was approved March 14 by
the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops' Administrative Committee. They asked
Catholics and others to join them in 'prayer and penance for our leaders and for the
complete protection of our first freedom-religious liberty-which is not only
protected in the laws and customs of our great nation, but rooted in the teachings of
our great tradition."').
155. See Brian Tashman, After Obama's Re-Election, Religious Right Demands
Repentance and Resistance, RIGHT WING WATCH (Nov. 8, 2012, 3:40 PM),
http://www.rightwingwatch.org/content/obama-reelection-religious-right-repentanceresistance (cataloguing anti-Obama rhetoric from a variety of religious groups and
figures).
156. See, e.g., Franciscan Univ. of Steubenville v. Sebelius, No. 2:12-CV-440, 2013 WL
1189854, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 2013) (dismissing Catholic plaintiffs' suit on
ripeness grounds); Cheryl Wetzstein, Lawsuit Takes on Birth Control Mandate,
153.
154.
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lead to a renewed political focus once a case is accepted for review
by the Supreme Court.
What lies in store for the future of legal debates about the role of
religion? It is hard to be optimistic about finding common ground
between believers and nonbelievers. Increasingly in law, even the
starting points in debates about religion are at issue and there often
seems to be a failure to communicate. Despite the undoubted
presence of goodwill on both sides, believers and nonbelievers have a
hard time hearing each other. I cite three illustrations below of what I
mean, but first let me describe what I see as happening in more
general terms.
Among legal academics on the secular side, a more penetrating
critique of religion has emerged-one that refuses to cede to religion
a unique normative authority that used to be taken for granted. Leiter
is a good example of this tendency. As we have seen, Leiter denies
the uniqueness of religion and contests the justification for religious
exemptions from generally applicable laws. 157 In terms of the
Establishment Clause, there is, at the same time, growing hostility to
the presence of religious imagery in the public square, which is also
hinted at in Leiter's book. 158
On the other side, legal academics that defend religion are
beginning to challenge the traditional assumptions that there can be
an adequate secular justification for law and that constitutional law is
an appropriate vehicle for the regulation of religion in American
public life. 159 This newly assertive religious view seeks to overturn
the secular paradigm and return religion to a foundational role
undergirding the legitimacy of law. 160 This religious view denies that
constitutional law can serve as a neutral referee in disputes about

157.
158.

159.

160.

WASH. TIMES (Dec. II, 2012),
http://www.washingtontimes.cornlnews/2012/dec/11/lawsuit-takes-on-birth-controlmandate/.
LEITER, supra note 2, at I (discussing one religious exemption from generally
applicable laws and one nonreligious exemption).
!d. at 139-40 n.6 (noting that while atheists and agnostics may sometimes raise
exemption issues, their claims really sound in Establishment Clause terms challenging
government religiosity).
See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of God: A Theory of Religious Liberty, 39
PEPP. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1159, 1161-63 (2013) (arguing that religious truth
exists and should form the basis of constitutional interpretation and the ordering of
government involvement in public life).
See Mark C. Modak-Truran, Reenchanting the Law: The Religious Dimension of
Judicial Decision-Making, 53 CATH. U. L. REv. 709, 718-21 (2004) (exploring
several models of secular and religious judicial decision-making and advocating for
uniform judicial reliance on religious justifications).
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religion and celebrates the Supreme Court's recent turn to ~tanding to
avoid deciding Establishment Clause cases. 161 Under this scenario,
the role of religion in public life is to be left to democratic forces to
determine or is to be judicially protected from a religiously justified
standpoint. 162
Three recent and well-known events in the American legal
academy illustrate these tendencies: a panel at a January 2012
Association of American Law Schools (AALS) meeting over the
ministerial exception case, Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC, 163 a November
2011 debate at Georgetown Law School between Michael McConnell
and Noah Feldman concerning whether religious liberty is special, 164
and the Religious Legal Theory conference at Pepperdine Law
School in February 2012. 165 Nothing that occurred at these events
diverged from positions already present in the scholarly literature, but
the juxtaposition of these three events seemed to mark a defining
moment in relations among believing and nonbelieving law faculty. 166
The AALS panel, entitled Church Autonomy, the Ministerial
Exception and Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC, took place on Saturday,
January 7, 2012, just a few days before the decision came down
unanimously upholding the concept of the ministerial exception
(January 11). 167 The participants on the panel were well-known in the
field. 168 Douglas Laycock, for example, perhaps the most influential
161.

162.
163.

164.

165.

166.
167.
168.

Id. at 732-33; see Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 593 (2007)
(holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge government funding of faithbased initiatives).
See Modak-Truran, supra note 160, at 731-33.
Final Program: Academic Freedom and Academic Duty, Ass'N AM. L. SCHS. XXVIII,
55, Dec. 9, 2011, http://www.aals.org/am2012/2012program.pdf [hereinafter Final
Program].
Noah Feldman & Michael McConnell, Keynote Debate at the Berkley Center for
Religion, Peace & World Affairs Conference: Is Religious Freedom an Independent or
Derivative Right? (Nov. 17, 2011), available at
http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/events/what-s-so-special-about-religiousfreedom.
Pepperdine Univ. Sch. of Law Conference: The Competing Claims of Law and
Religion: Who Should Influence Whom? (Feb. 23-25, 2012) (conference agenda and
program
may
be
viewed
at
https://law.pepperdine.edulnootbaar/newsevents/events/law-and-religion/Nootbaar-Law-and-Religion-Brochure.pdf).
For an earlier reference of the tensions between believers and nonbelievers on law
school faculties, see STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY 34-35 (2004).
See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694,
710 (2012); Final Program, supra note 163, at XXVII-XXVIII.
Richard W. Garnett of Notre Dame Law School was the moderator. The speakers
were Caroline Mala Corbin, University of Miami School of Law, Leslie C. Griffm,
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neutrality !heorist in the country, argued the case for the Lutheran
Church, and most of the other participants were involved in preparing
briefs on one side or the other in the Supreme Court. 169
Listening to the presentations, I was amazed at the divergence of
the starting points, which one would not necessarily expect, even in a
controversial legal dispute. As if to emphasize that there is a gender
divide in the academy over matters of religion, both Leslie Griffin
and Caroline Mala Corbin argued that religion should not be above
the law, a framework that Laycock strongly rejected. He and Robert
Tuttle emphasized the autonomy of religion in American history, a
special status that did not seem at all to move Corbin and Griffin.
The latter wanted to subsume religious liberty under a broader
heading of associational freedom, much as Leiter would subsume it
under the rubric of conscience.
The divide on the panel was reflected indirectly in the opinion in
Hosanna-Tabor that came down a few days later. 17° Chief Justice
Roberts' opinion rejected the government's position that there is no
such thing as a ministerial exception, and that churches and other
religious organizations must rely on "the constitutional right to
freedom of association" rather than any right "grounded in the
Religion Clauses themselves." 171 The Chief Justice called the
government's position "that the Religion Clauses have nothing to say
about a religious organization's freedom to select its own ministers,"
a "remarkable view," 172 which was surely not an admiring comment.
How often has it occurred that the federal government argues a
case to the Supreme Court and loses unanimously in this way at the
starting point of analysis? It must be rare. It seems to me that the

169.

170.
171.
172.

University of Houston Law Center, Douglas Laycock, University of Virginia School
of Law, Christopher C. Lund, Wayne State University Law School, and Robert W.
Tuttle, The George Washington University Law School. Final Program, supra note
163, at XXVII, XXVIII.
See Brief for Professor Eugene Vo1okh et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (No. 10-553), 2011 WL 2470847 (prepared in part by
Richard Garnett); Brief for Law and Religion Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (No. 10-553), 2011 WL 2470847
(prepared in part by Caroline Mala Corbin and Leslie C. Griffin); Brief for the
Lutheran Church - Missouri Synod as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, HosannaTabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (No. 10-553), 2011 WL 2470848 (prepared in part by
Christopher C. Lund); Audrey Waldrop, Prof Goes to High Court, CAVALIER DAILY,
Oct. 6, 2011, http://www.cavalierdaily.com/article/2011110/prof-goes-to-high-court.
See generally Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 704-06 (reciting and following the
Supreme Court's precedent of providing legal autonomy to religion).
/d. at 706.
/d.
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Justices were reflecting a worldview that took the preferred and
special status of religion for granted and seemed startled at the notion
that religion is not special and might have to fend for itself along with
other claimants of nonreligious associational freedom.
This clash of worldviews was also on display in the McConnellFeldman debate. 173 Feldman claimed that the presence of protections
for religion in the Constitution is merely a historical contingency and
challenged McConnell to justify normatively the claimed special
status of religion-by which Feldman meant claims to exemptions
from what the Smith opinion called "neutral laws of general
applicability," 174 to which the Free Exercise Clause was said in that
case to provide no protection.
Chief Justice Roberts' opinion in Hosanna-Tabor denied that Smith
contradicted the result in that case-recognition of the ministerial
exception to neutral laws-because Smith concerned individual
conduct versus the institutional integrity that was at issue in
Hosanna-Tabor. 175 But from Feldman's perspective, it would follow
that whatever protections religious institutions enjoy should be
enjoyed by institutions associated with other morally serious
commitments, such as the Sierra Club, or the Federalist Society. If
Smith is to be superseded by statutory protections for religion, those
protections should also be available to nonreligious claims of
conscience.
Challenges to the settled assumptions of law and religion were also
present at the third Religious Legal Theory conference at
Pepperdine. 176 However, these challenges came primarily from a
newly assertive pro-religion perspective. The opening speaker at the
conference, Michael Stokes Paulsen, challenged the Feldman position
(without reference to Feldman himself), arguing that the Vietnam
draft cases, which applied religious exemptions to persons who were

173. Feldman & McConnell, supra note 164.
174. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3 (1990), superseded
by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat.
1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)). Justice Scalia's majority
opinion was responding to Justice O'Connor's characterization, but he accepted it as a
fair summary of his opinion.
175. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707.
176. The various talks are all available for viewing. The Competing Claims of Law and
Religion: Who Should Influence Whom?, PEPPERDINE UNIV. SCH. OF L. (Feb. 23-25,
2012) (downloaded using iTunes). A number of the talks have been gathered in a
special issue of the Pepperdine Law Review. Symposium, The Competing Claims of
Law and Religion, 39 PEPP. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1051 (2013).
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not traditional believers, went too far. 177 According to Pauisen,
religious and secular claims to liberty are different. The recognition
of God's, or the gods', claims on believers is the basis for the religion
clauses in the Constitution. 178 This theory amounts to a religious
defense of religious liberty that denied a secular foundation to the
constitutional right-as was noted in response by commentator
Eugene Volokh. 179
Another of the plenary presenters, James Davison Hunter,
presented an additional aspect of the newly assertive religious
narrative, arguing that the secularization thesis is being debunked and
that we are in a post-secular period in which the model of distinct
spheres between religion and the secular (the model present in the
Hosanna-Tabor opinion) is overdrawn. 180
Nor is the current
constitutional regime neutral as between religion and the secular, but
rather represents a promotion of secularism. 181
Steven Smith, a very well-known figure in law and religion circles,
asked directly in the same plenary session in which Professor Hunter
spoke, "is secularism in crisis?," which he answered in the
affirmative. 182
Professor Smith echoed the claim that the
secularization thesis has failed and that the neutrality that law has
claimed is not neutral. 183
But the clearest challenge to the traditional law and religion
paradigm was the attempt to reinterpret the foundations of law, and
the legitimacy of law, from theological sources. Zachary Calo put
this claim most succinctly when he spoke of freeing law from its
secular captivity. 184 Other speakers at the conference, notably David
Opderbeck, and, from a different angle, Mark Modak-Truran, also
challenged the secular foundations of law. 185
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

183.
184.
185.

See Paulsen, supra note 159, at 1196-1203.
See id. at 1163--64.
See Eugene Volokh, The Priority of Law: A Response to Michael Stokes Paulsen, 39
PEPP. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1223, 1225-29 (2013).
See James Davison Hunter, Law, Religion, and the Common Good, 39 PEPP. L. REv.
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 1065, 1070--71 (2013).
See id. at l 078.
Law, Religion, and the Common Good: Reflections on Challenges of Late Modernity
on The Competing Claims of Law and Religion: Who Should Influence Whom?,
PEPPERDINE UNIV. SCH. OF L. (Feb. 23-25, 2012) (downloaded using iTunes).
!d. Professor Smith's presentation was not included in the Law Review issue.
Zachory R. Calo, FaithfUl Presence and Theological Jurisprudence: A Response to
James Davison Hunter, 39 PEPP. L. REv. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1083, 1083 (2013).
Who Should Influence Whom on The Competing Claims of Law and Religion: Who
Should Influence Whom?, PEPPERDINE UNIV. SCH. OF L. (Feb. 23-25, 2012)
(downloaded using iTunes); Secularization on The Competing Claims of Law and
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The conference was not monolithic. Micah Schwartzman, for
example, strongly echoed and deepened the Feldman and Leiter
position that there is nothing distinctively normative in religion to
warrant special protections from generally applicable laws. 186 In fact,
an increasing conflict of worldviews was visible at the conference.
Some defenders of religion in the legal academy are clearly set on
reclaiming ground they feel has been illegitimately ceded to the
secular. In contrast with these religious voices, the secularly oriented
do not share the view that secularism is in crisis. They are not
willing to accept a more religiously based legal regime.
The similarities and differences between many believers and
nonbelievers in the context of increasing distance over the
importance of religion may be summarized as follows. For the
believer, religion is different from nonreligion-belief from
nonbelief. They are mutually exclusive categories and can each be
defined, at least to some extent. Of the two categories, religion is of
special significance, compared to any of the moral commitments that
a nonbeliever might have. For the nonbeliever, religion is also
different from nonreligion-belief from nonbelief. But, in contrast to
the believer, the nonbeliever does not consider religion to be of
unique significance. The moral commitments of the nonbeliever are
of equal normative weight compared to religious commitments.
This is why the believers and nonbelievers disagree about the
justification for religious exemptions from generally applicable laws.
Although both agree that religion can be distinguished from
nonreligion, for the nonbeliever, extending exemptions to religious
belief only is not justified. 187 For the believer, in contrast, such
restricted religious exemptions are usually justified. 188 The growing
gap between believers and nonbelievers can thus be seen to begin,
Religion: Who Should lrifluence Whom?, PEPPERDINE UNN. SCH. OF LAW (Feb. 23,
2012) (downloaded using iTunes).
186. Professor Schwartzman published an article based on this presentation. Micah
Schwartzman, What If Religion is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REv. 1351 (2012).
Schwartzman endorses the analogical approach to granting religious exemptions to
secular beliefs and indeed endorses and constitutionalizes the Vietnam draft cases in a
manner similar to that of this article. See id. at 1419-20. Not surprisingly, the
fundamental difference between us lies in the conceptualization of claims like those in
Seeger and Welsh. For Schwartzman, those not affiliated with traditional religions
remain "nonbelievers" with "secular doctrines that cannot be distinguished . . . from
their religious counterparts." !d. at 1421. Schwartzman cannot ask, what if we are all
religious, even though many of his conclusions would be the same.
187. See LEITER, supra note 2, at 132-33.
188. See id. at 92-93.
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surprisingly, in an agreement between the two sides that religion and
nonreligion-belief and nonbelief-are different. This, as shown
above, is specifically Leiter's starting point. Thus, generally, critics
of religion who favor Leiter's Anti-Religion Equality Project and
defenders of religion, who reject it, share this same starting point
concerning the difference between religion and nonreligion. 189
IV. EVALUATING LEITER'S PROJECT
When Why Tolerate Religion? is discussed, the first point raised is
generally whether Leiter has succeeded in showing that religious
conscience is entitled to no greater level of protection than is
nonreligious conscience. 190 Leiter himself begins his book with this
question of special protections for religion. 191
To make the case against the special value of religion, however,
one must be able to distinguish religious conscience from
nonreligious conscience, which means distinguishing religion as a
separate realm. That requires a definition of religion, which Leiter
attempts to give. 192 Does he succeed?
As stated above, Leiter attempts in Chapter 2 to defme religion in
terms of the nature of its demands on the believer vis-a-vis generally
applicable law .193 Leiter presents three characteristics of religion that
he claims distinguish it from other realms of conscience: religion
issues in categorical demands on action, it does not answer ultimately

189. See Schwartzman, supra note 186, at 1370 (stating that religion is different from
nonreligion); see also Feldman & McConnell, supra note 164.
190. See, e.g., Robert Merrihew Adams, Why Tolerate Religion?, NOTRE DAME PHIL. REvs.
(Jan. 6, 2013) (book review), http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/36599-why-tolerate-religion/;
Stanley Fish, Op-Ed., Religious Exemptions and the Liberal State: A Christmas
Column,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Dec.
24,
2012,
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/24/religious-exemptions-and-theliberal-state-a-christmas-column; Book Notes, 38 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 538, 544
(2013) ("[Leiter's] book addresses the philosophical and constitutional puzzle of why
religion is singled out for preferential treatment in law and public discourse in the
United States, for example, why religious obligations that conflict with the law are
recorded toleration while other obligations of conscience are not.").
191. The book opens with the two instances of claimed exemptions from a generally
applicable weapons ban in public school: one religiously-based and one not. See
LEITER, supra note 2, at 1-3.
192. See id. at 31-37.
193. Despite referring to a definition of religion, it is not clear that Leiter really is trying to
define religion in general. See id. at 34-37. There are no references to, or discussion
of, rites, practices, or rituals as typical defming characteristics of religion. See id. at
31-37. It might be more accurate to say that Leiter is attempting to define the
demands of religious conscience rather than attempting to define religion itself.

2014] Vietnam Draft Cases and the Pro-Religion Equality Project

31

to evidence and reason, and it renders death and suffering
intelligible. 194
Of these three characteristics, only one-the insulation from
evidence-is really held by Leiter to apply to religion alone. Leiter
admits that certain systems of morality in principle also issue in
categorical demands, though he claims that as a practical matter only
religion gives much effect to this categoricity. 195 Obviously, the fact
that only a small number of people act categorically on the basis of
morality, thus contradicting Leiter's definition of religion, does not
remove the contradiction. Morality can issue in categorical demands
on behavior. Therefore, categorical demand on action is not a unique
characteristic of religion.
Similarly, Leiter states very clearly that "nonreligious individuals
find ways of achieving existential consolation" without engaging in
religion. 196 So, this characteristic also does not distinguish religion
uniquely.
The characteristic of religion that remains, and indeed the one that
does all the work in Leiter's book of distinguishing and devaluing
religious claims of conscience, is the claimed insulation from reason
and evidence. 197 How convincing is Leiter's claim that there are at
least some central beliefs of every religion that do not ultimately
answer to evidence and reason?
This is not an easy matter, but overall Leiter's position is either
false or at least drastically overstated. In the first place, we all decide
matters, even important matters, without reference to reason and
evidence. 198 Leiter undoubtedly would respond that, while this may
be true, outside the religious realm, people can at least change our
minds in light of new evidence. But how often do we actually do
this? 199 How many business people changed their minds about the
efficient market hypothesis after the collapse of financial markets in
2008? How many liberals changed their minds about President
Reagan's policies after the collapse of the Soviet Union? Paul
194.
195.
196.
197.

/d. at 34, 52.
See id. at 38-39.
Id. at 62.
For example, the main reason Leiter gives for not respecting religion in chapter 4 is
the insulation of religion from evidence. See id. at 81.
198. See LEONARD MLODINOW, SUBLIMINAL: HOW YOUR UNCONSCIOUS MIND RULES YOUR
BEHAVIOR (2012).
199. John Gray made this similar point in his review of Leiter in New Statesman. John
Gray, Why Tolerate Religion? Most of Our Beliefs are Unwarranted, Even Absurd,
NEW
STATESMAN,
Nov.
29,
2010,
Says
John
Gray,
http://www .newstatesman.corn/print/culture/culture/20 12/ II /giant-leaps-mankind.
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Krugman has been complaining for quite some time that despite all of
the evidence showing that austerity policies have failed to generate
economic growth, people keep on proposing austerity as a program to
combat our economic ills. 200
Leiter might say this is all a matter of degree. Religious dogmas
are even less subject to disproof than are other kinds of beliefs. But I
wonder if he is right. He certainly adduces no evidence to show this.
He just assumes it out of a kind of secular prejudice against the
rationality of religion.
It is not even clear what Leiter means by "insulated from reason"
and evidence. 201 When Leiter refers to "ordinary standards of reasons
and evidence in common sense and the sciences,"202 he is claiming, in
effect, that everyone knows-it is a matter of common sense-that
miracles are impossible and angels don't exist. While I agree with
Leiter on these matters, I am also aware that most people do not agree
with him or with me, and that they have their reasons for hot
agreeing. Leiter fails to acknowledge that the reasons that support
certain religious beliefs are not unreasonable.
Take two famous examples: the writing of the Qur'an and the
resurrection of Jesus. In terms of the Qur'an, sincere Muslims have
asked me whether, given all we know historically about the Prophet
Mohammed, I really believe that Mohammed alone wrote the Qur'an.
The fact is that I don't believe that. It does not seem possible. I
simply assume, irrefutably, as I am certain Leiter assumes as well,
that the Qur'an was not dictated to the Prophet Mohammed by an
angel, as the tradition asserts. But, I recognize that this is just my
assumption. The assumption that dictation by an angel would be
impossible does not answer, however, the question of how the Qur'an
came to be written.
In terms of the resurrection, N.T. Wright has firmly pressed the
argument that, given all we know, the resurrection must actually have
happened. 203 Certainly, something strange must have happened. It is
more likely that the Taliban would begin holding cocktail parties than
it is that pious Jews of the 1st century A.D. would countenance eating
pork a few years after the death of Jesus, unless something
extraordinary had happened.
-

See Paul Krugman, How the Case for Austerity Has Crumbled, N.Y. REv. BOOKS,
June 6, 2013, http://www.nybooks.cornlarticles/archives/20 13/jun/06/how-caseausterity-has-crumbled/.
20 I. LEITER, supra note 2, at 81.
202. /d.
203. 3 N.T. WRIGHT, THE RESURRECTION OF THE SON OF GOD 717 (2003).
200.
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As to the nature of that "something," the question is: what did
happen to the body of Jesus? There seems to be no historical reason
to doubt that Temple authorities began to persecute the nascent Jesus
movement shortly after the crucifixion. Since rumors of the
resurrection apparently circulated soon after the crucifixion, it may be
inferred that the Temple authorities would have announced the
location of Jesus' body, if they had known where it was in order to
discredit the new heretical movement. Conversely, it would take an
extreme anachronism to suppose that pious Jews buried Jesus and
knew where his body lay, but kept quiet in order to manipulate public
opinion about the resurrection. The third possibility is that no one
cared where Jesus was buried, and therefore the knowledge of the
location was lost. But this seems unlikely, given the public nature
and scandal of crucifixion itself.
I realize that this does not prove anything. People like Leiter and
me believe the resurrection did not happen because nothing like
resurrection can happen, based on the laws science has discovered. I
just wish Leiter would acknowledge that both my position and his are
based on a pre-existing worldview. He and I are not considering the
possibility of angels and resurrection and are not really weighing the
evidence.
Not only do all human beings come to conclusions without reasons
sometimes, and maybe even most of the time, and not only are there
reasons adducible to support religious doctrines Leiter fmds
epistemologically unwarranted, but it is an exaggeration that religious
belief does not respond to the kinds of scientific and common sense
arguments that Leiter considers normative. The power of scientific
conclusions over even highly conservative religious believers is
demonstrated by the insistence in the debates over the teaching of
evolution in the public schools that "evolution "is only a theory." 204
If evolution is only a theory, then the religious believer can oppose it
without opposing science itself.
This formal deference by religious believers to science, at least
theoretically, is also why the alleged weaknesses in evolutionary
theory-the supposed impossibility of evolving an eye, for
example205-are deemed to be so significant by supporters of a
See, e.g., Mark Isaak, Five Major Misconceptions About Evolution, TALKORIGINS
(Oct. I, 2003), http://www.talkorigins.org/faqs/faq-misconceptions.html.
205. This criticism is voiced so frequently that it has its own rebuttal by evolutionists. See
Is the Eye Too Complex to Have Evolved Naturally?, EVOLUTION F AQ,
http://www.evolutionfaq.com/faq/eye-too-complex-have-evolved-naturally
(last
visited Dec. 20, 2013).
204.
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biblically based account of creation. Where possible, there is a clear
desire to be at home with science and not to directly confront it.
Nor is this strategy merely a means to avoid judicial condemnation
of creationism under the Establishment Clause. The epistemological
basis of this religious evolution strategy is demonstrated by the
relative absence of challenges to the teaching of geology in the public
schools. At one time, the age of the earth might also have been
challenged "as only a theory" in light of the literal reading of Genesis
that shows the world to be only a few thousand years old. 206 This
"age of the earth" challenge to accepted scientific orthodoxy has
collapsed not because it was not as essential to, or inherent in,
Christian thought at one time as was opposition to evolutionary
theory, but because of the seemingly insurmountable scientific
support for a range of interconnected dating techniques that show a
universe 13.8 billion years old and an earth around 4.5 billion years
old.zo7
But even if Leiter were accurate in his description of some
monotheistic sects as resistant to "evidence and reason," his
definition of religion would still fall short, because, to serve Leiter's
purpose, his description must apply to all religions and to religion
uniquely. It is easy to see that resistance to what Leiter considers
evidence and reason is not unique to religion, but it is also obvious
that different religious traditions are resistant to scientific discoveries
to differing extents. Indeed, the differing degrees of acceptance or
hostility to the scientific revolutions of the modem age are one of the
markers of a liberal versus an orthodox and conservative
Christianity. 208
Leiter knows that he has a quandary here and he deals with it in an
almost shameful way-by dismissing with the merest nod the work
of people like William Alston and Alvin Plantinga as "nothing more
than an effort to insulate religious faith from ordinary standards of

206.

Most specifically, if not most famously, Archbishop James Ussher, in 1658,
calculated the moment of creation as occurring on the night preceding Sunday,
October 23,4004 BC. JAMES USSHER, THE ANNALS OF THE WORLD 7-8 (1658).
207. See The Origin of the Universe- Three Views, MUSINGS ON Sci. & THEOLOGY (Aug.
13, 20 13), http://musingsonscience. wordpress.com/20 13/08113/the-origin-of-theuniverse-three-views/.
208. "We are well aware that there is a lot of traditional Christian theology that has to be
revised in light of our contemporary scientific understanding, and that there are things
that must simply be discarded. That's what being a Liberal Christian is about." James
F. McGrath, Evolution and Liberal Christianity, PATHEOS (June 4, 2009),
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/exploringourmatrix/2009/06/evolution-and-liberalchristianity.html.
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reasons and evidence in common sense and the sciences . . . "209
Leiter also dismisses the entire "intellectualist" tradition in religious
thought, including William Paley and Thomas Aquinas, as "post-hocrationalization," because "it never turns out that the fundamental
beliefs are revised in light of new evidence."210
It is not true that in these religious traditions fundamental beliefs
have not been revised. Fundamental beliefs are not repudiated, but
they come to be interpreted very differently. 211 The "Cosmic Christ"
of Teilhard de Chardin, for example, is obviously exquisitely
sensitive to the findings of the scientific age. 212 Leiter might insist
here that efforts like these are unpersuasively vague or mystical. He
might not be able to appreciate that efforts by believers to stretch
language to reach transcendent religious truths are the way that
religious believers who do accept the scientific tradition reinterpret
the historic doctrines of their religions. Such responses may not be
the way that Leiter would prefer that believers respond to evidence
and reason, but these are responses that are clearly not insulated from
evidence and reason.

209. LEITER, supra note 2, at 81.
210. !d. at 39--40.
211. Robert Adams has made just this point in criticizing Leiter on this point: "Unless by
'revised' Leiter means completely abandoned, this claim is simply false." Adams,
supra note 190.
212. See, for example, how Louis M. Savary explains the Cosmic Christ concept from de
Chardin in an excerpt from his book, The Divine Milieu Explained:
In The Spiritual Exercises, St. Ignatius taught Teilhard how to dig
deeply into the mind and heart of Jesus of Nazareth and how to be
transformed by his suffering, death, and resurrection. In the
sixteenth century when Ignatius lived, he knew nothing of the
many scientific facts that are simply part of our daily assumptions
about reality. For most people then, the flat earth was the center
of God's creation, and God lived up in the sky. And his
traditional spirituality reflects those beliefs . . . . In The Divine
Milieu, Teilhard the scientist takes us many centuries further in
the life of Christ. He invites us to learn to see, as he does, not
only the Christ of 2,000 years ago, but also the magnificent Being
that the Risen Christ with his Total Body has developed into
during two millennia. He also invites us to glimpse into Christ's
future, to identify the goal toward which that Total Body of Christ
has been constantly evolving.
LOUIS M. SAVARY, TEILHARDDE CHARD IN THE DIVINE MILIEU EXPLAINED: A
SPIRITUALITY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY xiii-xiv (2007).
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For the moment, let us assume that my criticism shows that Leiter
fails in his effort to defme religion as a realm separate from
nonreligious conscientious belief. Does that make any difference to
Leiter's ultimate conclusion?
The answer is no, but this seems counterintuitive, even
preposterous. Leiter's book is all about religion. How can his
fundamental failure to engage that very topic successfully turn out to
mean nothing?
The answer to that question lies in the peculiar terms of the is
religion special? debate. That debate has always assumed that
religion and nonreligion must be two distinct categories. 213 That
assumption was at its most peculiar display in the debate between
Feldman and McConnell, adverted to above, in which, at a certain
point, the two participants argued over whether Antigone's demand
of conscience was religious or philosophical. 214
On reflection, it is obvious that a question like this-whether a
character in ancient Greek drama is reflecting modem categories of
belief and nonbelief-is simply incoherent. Philosophy and religion
were intertwined in that age. 215 To be fair, Professor McConnell
appeared in the debate to be uncertain about how to answer such a
question, perhaps because the question seemed so strange. But the
fact that neither participant in the debate expressly stated the
obvious-that the distinction between philosophy and religion could
not be made in our terms in that context-demonstrates the agendas
that distort discussion of the question whether religion is "special."
Defenders of religion, like McConnell, do not wish to admit
religion's shared connection with all human endeavors that seek
meaning in existence, because they believe to do so would surrender
special prerogatives that religion now enjoys both legally and
culturally. 216
Conversely, those who challenge religion, like
Feldman, do not wish to admit that the category of religion is
potentially vast, because the origins of their challenge lie in a
modernist, rationalist skepticism that views religion as an

213.

See Feldman & McConnell, supra note 164 (posing the question of whether

Antigone's actions were motivated by her religious or philosophical beliefs,
demonstrating the assumption that the two categories are distinct).
214. /d.
215. See generally PIERRE HAooT, PHILOSOPHY AS A WAY OF LIFE: SPIRITUAL EXERCISES
FROM SOCRATES TO FOUCAULT (Arnold I. Davidson ed., Michael Chase trans. 1995)
(explaining that religion and philosophy were so related that there was a constant
conflict between Christians and pagans due to each group borrowing concepts from
the other).
216. See Feldman & McConnell, supra note 164.
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indefensible, supernatural-based endeavor. 217 If religion were viewed
in a fuller and richer context, that skeptical challenge would collapse.
Leiter takes the debate, is religion special?, one more step. Unlike
Feldman, Leiter does not stop at comparing two separate realmsreligious conscience and nonreligious conscience-and concluding
that they are of equal weight. Instead, Leiter argues that religious
conscience is just a particular form of conscientious commitment. 218
Leiter then concludes that no form of conscientious commitment
justifies exemption from generally applicable laws. 219
For all Leiter's endeavor to define religion, therefore, religion
ultimately disappears in his argument as a separate category. That is
why Leiter's failure to define religion adequately does not affect his
conclusion. If Leiter, instead of attempting to define religion as a
separate realm, had admitted that religion cannot easily be defined,
that it shares a number of Wittgenstein family resemblances/ 20 he
could still have concluded that all of these forms of conscience could
be subsumed under conscience generally and that all such conscience
claims should be subordinated to the pursuit of the common good by
the state.
Leiter's conclusion that there is no principled justification for
exemption from generally applicable laws vindicates the fear of
defenders of religion that losing the debate over the special value of
religion will ultimately undermine religious liberty. Ironically,
Leiter's project makes it clear that the subsumption of religion into
conscience also potentially threatens nonreligious liberty of
conscience. 221 Leiter's conclusion is not about religion at all, but is
about the dominance of the demands of the state. 222 In Leiter's world,
we are all equal, believers and nonbelievers, and we are all
subservient to the state. 223 This is the conclusion of the Anti-Religion
Equality Project.
But what if Leiter's failure to defme religion as a separate category
were turned on its head? Is it possible that religion is not easily
defined as a separate category because most people most of the time,
217. !d.
218. LEITER, supra note 2, at 64.
219. !d. at 101.
220. Wittgenstein famously stated that the concept of a game could not be defmed by rigid
characteristics, but only by "family resemblances."
LUDWIG WITIGENSTEIN,
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 31e-32e (G.E.M. Anscornbe trans., 2nd ed. 1958).
221. See LEITER, supra note 2, at 59.
222. See id. at 14-15.
223. See id.
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and maybe all people at least some of the time, are engaged in
religious quests? If that were understood to be the case, we would all
be equal, as Leiter suggests, but the state would not necessarily be
dominant. In the next part of this article, I attempt to unfold that ProReligion Equality Project.
V. THE PRO-RELIGION EQUALITY PROJECT
What should the realm of conscientious belief be called? Certainly,
that realm includes many beliefs that are not conventionally
considered religions. So, perhaps the entire realm should be called
conscience, which is Leiter's approach? 24 But that realm also
includes much of conventional religious belief. So, perhaps the realm
should all be called religious.
One way to resolve this question would be to allow the participants
to defme their own categories. If we proceed that way, many
participants in organized religions would insist that their beliefs are
"religious" while the beliefs of persons not associated with organized
religion are generally not "religious." Similarly, many persons who
are not a part of organized religions would agree that their beliefs are
not "religious," while the beliefs of people who are a part of
organized religions are "religious." This is what was meant abovethat the participants in the is religion special? debate insist that
religion and nonreligion are two separate realms.
But I am not going to allow the participants in the debate to define
their own positions. The participants in this debate are overstating,
and thus enhancing, our differences. For reasons of their own
agendas, they treat relative differences between believers and
nonbelievers as absolute. In fact, most believers and nonbelievers
have a great deal in common.
But even assuming that the participants on both sides in this debate
are wrong and there are not two separate realms, the question still
remains: whether it is best to speak generally of conscience or of
religion? Another way to proceed at this point would be to define
religion broadly and then to insist that all manifestations of
conscience fit into that definition. I cannot avoid doing a little of that
as the reader will soon see, but general defmitions of religion are not
going to be of much help in determining the reach of religious
Religion is simply too vast a phenomenon.
exemptions. 225
224. See id. at 17.
225. I agree entirely with Nelson Tebbe's comprehensive analysis on this point. See
Nelson Tebbe, Nonbelievers, 97 VA. L. REv. II II, 1115 (20 II). Jeffrey Lipshaw has
also criticized the either/or definitional approach in this context. Jeffrey M. Lipshaw,
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Wittgenstein is right that we are not dealing with defmitions, but with
family resemblances. 226 The question of religion or conscience
cannot be decided by overarching definitions.
So I will start at a more modest point. The context with which we
are concerned is not religion in general or conscience in general.
Rather, we are dealing with religious exemptions from generally
applicable laws. Therefore, of the three qualities of religion in
Leiter's definition-categorical demands, insulation from evidence
and reason, and existential comfort-the most important quality is the
issuance of categorical demands. For these types of demands are
what bring the individual, conventionally religious or not, into
conflict with the laws of the state.
What is a categorical demand? Leiter defines it as a "demand[] that
must be satisfied no matter what an individual's antecedent desires
and no matter what incentives or disincentives the world offers up ...
227
•"
Remember that though Leiter is here defining religion, he would
agree that nonreligious conscience can also make demands like
this. 228
Let us take the example of the conscientious vegan. This person is
going to resist any demand by the state to eat meat.
The
conscientious vegan is going to be willing to suffer sanctions rather
than submit to such a demand. 229
What accounts for this conscientious belief and willingness to
suffer? It must be more than a general belief about how one should
live. If someone believes, for example, that people should regularly
exercise, that person would not be willing to go to jail for the sake of
exercise if the state were to forbid it. The vegan who had simply
concluded that eating meat is bad for one's health, would have no
reason to go to jail, which is obviously very bad for one's health,
rather than eat meat.
It seems obvious that a vegan who is willing to suffer serious
consequences to avoid eating meat must have concluded that killing
animals and eating them is wrong. This is the core of Leiter's
categorical demand. The person who feels that she must oppose the
Can There Be a Religion of Reasons? A Response to Leiter's Circular Conception of
Religious Belief, 26 J.L. & RELIGION 43,45-46 (2010-2011).
226. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 220, at 31 e-32e.
227. LEITER, supra note 2, at 34.
228. See id.
229. I recognize that among conscientious vegans, there will be differing levels of
commitment and willingness to suffer. But that is obviously true of religious believers
as well.
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commands of the state despite the obvious harm this will do to her
own self-interest must be a moral realist who has concluded that the
state's demand is objectively wrong. The conscientious vegan does
not say, "eating meat is wrong in my opinion"-or if she does, she
does so for reasons of political correctness and does not really mean
it. She means that eating meat is morally wrong for everyone. The
force of a categorical demand is heard in Martin Luther's cry: "Here I
stand. I can do nothing else.'mo
The use of the Luther example is intentional because demands like
this are usually associated with traditional religion. Such demands
need not be commands by a God, though they are often believed to be
such. A Buddhist, for example, might believe that it is wrong to kill
or harm living beings without believing that there is a supernatural
being issuing a command to that effect. Even though not necessarily
theistic, categorical demands have usually been grounded in some
form of traditional religion, which is a category that is widely
understood. 231
Nevertheless, despite this history, the commitment to objective
morality need not be called religious. I have asserted that the
tradition of moral realism is not a religious position, but a
philosophical one. 232 My change in terminology here has to do with
the different roles of the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause. 233
As I have argued elsewhere, moral realism, or the theory of
objective value234-the belief that right and wrong are not just matters
of opinion, but have to do with the nature of human beings and the
nature of the universe-is shared by all the great wisdom
traditions. 235 It is, in the words of C.S. Lewis, "the belief that certain
attitudes are really true, and others really false, to the kind of thing
230. ALAN ACKERMAN, JUST WORDS 98 (2013). This is often quoted as Luther's response
before the Diet of Worms, but absent from eyewitness accounts. I know there are
people who will say at this point that a moral subjectivist is also capable of standing
up for a moral principle, even at great cost. The late Richard Rorty was undoubtedly
such a person. I must admit that I simply cannot understand that position. I cannot
understand why anyone would suffer for the sake of a mere preference. But see, e.g.,
S.T. JOSHI, Goo's DEFENDERS 115 (2003) (explaining the motivation of moral
subjectivists to propagate the spread of their preferences).
231. See LEITER, supra note 2, at 138 n.6.
232. See Bruce Ledewitz, Seeking 'Common Ground': A Secular Statement, 38 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 49, 74 (2010).
233. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 827-28 ( 1978).
234. I use these terms interchangeably.
235. See BRUCE LEDEWITZ, CHURCH, STATE, AND THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN SECULARISM I 06
(2011).
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the universe is and the kind of things we are." 236 This commitment
can be called religious or nonreligious depending on the context. 237
In Establishment Clause terms, the commitment to objective values
cannot be considered an establishment of religion, because then the
government could not teach moral realism or objective values
without violating the Constitution. 238 It is hard to imagine public
elementary school instruction along relativist lines-would
kindergarten teachers remind students that "in our culture, we take
turns and do not take what does not belong to us?" The category of
religion in the context of the Establishment Clause must be
interpreted more narrowly than that.
But in the context of free exercise values, the commitment to
objective value is the very ground from which all categorical
demands emerge. Religion in the context of free exercise and related
statutory protections should be seen in precisely these broad terms.
Religion in the sense of the tradition of objective values is the
common ground that unites most of us in the face of the challenges of
relativism and nihilism.
There is nothing arbitrary in calling the commitment to objective
values religious in this general sense. I will return to Ronald
Dworkin's understanding of religion just before his death in the last
Part of this article. But in an earlier view, in 1992, Dworkin argued
that the commitment to the objectivity of values is a preeminent
aspect of religion. 239 In context, Dworkin was criticizing pro-life
legislation as religiously motivated and thus potentially a violation of
the Establishment Clause. 240 Dworkin wrote that:
the belief that the value of human life transcends its
value for the creature whose life it is-that human life
is objectively valuable from the point of view, as it
were, of the universe-is plainly a religious belief,
even when it is held by people who do not believe in a
personal deity. It is, in fact, the most fundamental
purpose of traditional religions to make exactly that
236. C.S. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN 29 (1947).
237. See TRIBE, supra note 233, at 828.
238. Some years ago, Larry Tribe argued for differing definitions of religion in Free
Exercise cases versus Establishment Clause cases along these lines in his influential
constitutional treatise. /d. at 827-28.
239. Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should be Overruled,
59 U. CHI. L. REv. 381,413 (1992).
240. /d.
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claim to its faithful, and to embody it in some vision
or narrative that makes the belief seem intelligible and
persuasive. 241
Whether or not this God's-eye view of the universe is sensible
without God-Hilary Putnam challenges it without surrendering at
least a minimal moral realism242-is not the issue here. The
conscientious vegan very likely considers animal life objectively
valuable from the point of view of the universe, since it is at least
questionable how one might rate an animal's life from its own point
of view. Objective values require something akin to this kind of godlike perspective.
In linking religion and the objectivity of values as a criticism of
legislation, Dworkin was making the mistake of mixing up
Establishment and Free Exercise Clause issues. Government is
constantly teaching the objective value of human life-in public
schools, in government programs, in official announcementswithout raising Establishment Clause concems. 243 Dworkin could not
possibly have meant that this entire edifice of objective values claims
is unconstitutional as an establishment of religion. But Dworkin was
right about the meaning of religion for purposes of the Free Exercise
Clause and related statutes protecting religious liberty. 244 There,
moral realism is the mark of religious commitment.
An additional ground for associating religion generally with the
objectivity of values is the consistent support of moral relativism by
critics of religion. At one time I would have said that the charge of
moral relativism against atheists was a calumny. But it has since
become clear to me that indeed this is the case. Leiter, for example,
expressly rejects moral realism. 245 And, as I have argued elsewhere,
the New Atheists also generally reject moral realism or the

241. !d. at413-14.
242. See HILARY PUTNAM, REALISM WITH A HUMAN FACE 37 (James Conant ed., 1992)
("And if a rebirth of a full-bodied, red-blooded metaphysical realism were the way to
get people to accept the objectivity of ethics, then I would almost be willing to pay the
price ofletting that happen.").
243. See TRIBE, supra note 233, at 829 (stating that public schools may require a moment
of silence or meditation without violating the Establishment Clause); President Barack
Obama, Statement by the President on the School Shooting in Newtown, Connecticut
14,
2012),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and(Dec.
video/video/20 12/12/14/president-obama-makes-statement-shooting-newtownconnecticut#transcript (discussing the value of human life).
244. See supra notes 239-41 and accompanying text.
245. See LEITER, supra note 2, at 163 n.12.
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objectivity of values, though there is reason to doubt the consistency
of their position. 246
But the most candid assertion of the relationship between moral
subjectivism and religious skepticism is set forth in S.T. Joshi's 2003
book, God's Defenders: What They Believe and Why They Are
Wrong. 247 Joshi's book is an aggressive and breezy attack on seven
so-called defenders of God248 and would not be cited as authoritative
except for the fact that the book was published by Prometheus Books,
which tends to be a reliable barometer for characterizing the thinking
of current religious skepticism in America. 249
Joshi expressly states that while morals are "nothing more than
preferences," they are still real, but only in the sense that they are
"real preferences."250
He rejects C.S. Lewis's criticism of
naturalism-for "naturalism" substitutes moral relativism or moral
subjectivism-that if good and evil were really just illusions, the
people who profess that position would not work so hard at
improving the human race. 251 Joshi claims that he prefers that his
preferences be adopted by others, even though his own preferences
are not objectively "true."252
Joshi states the epistemological problem very succinctly. He writes
that there are only two ways in which moral claims can be objectively
right or wrong: either "there must be something built into the fabric
of the universe that makes some moral values right and others
wrong" or "a god or gods must dictate a code of morals to human
beings."253 Since Joshi believes that the first option "is so obviously
false that its mere utterance is sufficient to refute it,"254 the

246.
247.
248.
249.

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

See LEDEWITZ, CHURCH, STATE, AND THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN SECULARISM, supra note
235, at 184 (discussing Richard Dawkins and the New Atheists).
JOSHI, supra note 230.
See id. at passim (labeling T.S. Eliot, William F. Buckley Jr., Jerry Fallwell, Annie
Dillard, William James, G.K. Chesterton, and C.S. Lewis as God's defenders).
John W. Loftus, Prometheus Books is the Premier Atheist Publisher in Our
Generation,
DEBUNKJNG
CHRISTIANITY
(Dec.
31,
2009),
http://debunkingchristianity.blogspot.com/2009/12/prometheus-books-is-premieratheist.html. The reader can get a feel for the sides concerning Prometheus by looking
at John Loftus's blog entry defending the publishing house as the "premier atheist
publisher of our generation." !d.
JOSHI, supra note 230, at 115.
!d. at 114-15.
!d. at 115.
!d. at 269.
!d.
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relationship between religion, and indeed theism, and moral realism
is considered by him to be very close. 255
But even if moral realism and religion are reasonably connected,
and even if moral realism and categorical demands are connected,
there is still the question of whether taking Leiter's first category as
the basis for applying religious exemptions, as I am proposing here,
is practical. Treating categorical demand as defming religion for
purposes of religious exemptions from general laws may seem too
broad for any court to actually apply. It suggests that the claimant's
demand for exemption would always be determinative. Because of
this problem, courts will inevitably end up applying something like
an analogical approach to religious exemptions in which the beliefs
of a claimant who is not a member of a traditional and organized
religious group is compared to the beliefs of persons who are
members of such groups. 256 Kent Greenawalt has championed just
such an approach, 257 and, as I will argue in the next Part, that was the
basic approach of the United States Supreme Court in the Vietnam
War draft cases. 258
The breadth, and therefore the impracticality, of using categorical
demands as the ground of religious exemption is a practical problem,
but it is not a theoretical one. In theory, and even in practice if only a
judge could really get to know a particular claimant for a religious
exemption, the genuine experience of a categorical demand would by
itself be quite sufficient to justify a religious exemption. The
willingness to suffer sanctions rather than violate one's beliefs, which
is what Leiter means by a categorical demand, is precisely the kind of
commitment that religious exemptions aim to protect. 259 The
practical problem is that exemptions exist and therefore we do not
know who would be willing to suffer "for the sake of the name" as
opposed to those who are claiming the exemption out of some lesser
commitment. But if we could be sure of who is willing to suffer

255.
256.

257.
258.
259.

See id. at 269-70, 278-79, 302.
See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66, 173-74, 187 (1965). For a good
example of the power of analogy in a slightly different religious context, see Malnak
v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197,207 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring) stating, "[i]fthe old
defmition [of religion] has been repudiated, however, the new definition remains not
yet fully formed. It would appear to be properly described as a definition by analogy."
/d.
See I KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND
FAIRNESS 139-41 (2006).
See infra notes 272-88, 319-25 and accompanying text.
See United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943); LEITER, supra note 2,
at 34.
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severe consequences rather than obey the state, we would know who
should be granted a religious exemption.
It should also be noted that an empirical disagreement with the
majority is not a ground of a categorical demand. A claimant for
religious exemption who is asserting, in effect, "if matters were as
you believe them to be, I would agree with you," is not responding to
a categorical demand in Leiter's sense.
This is not a distinction that can be pushed very hard. The
conscientious vegan may very well have what might be termed
empirical disagreements with the majority. She may believe that
animals possess a self-consciousness and sensitivity that the majority
disputes as a matter of fact. But that kind of disagreement is not fully
empirical. The starting point of the vegan and the vegan's view of
the burden of proof differ from that of the majority in ways that
plainly reflect a value dispute rather than a purely empirical one.
What I mean by an empirical disagreement will become clear in
Part VI of this article, in which I discuss exemptions from mandatory
vaccination laws. In that context, a parent who judges vaccinations
to be dangerous to his child is not going to permit a vaccination to be
performed and is going to be willing to suffer severe sanction rather
than do so. Yet, if that same parent agreed with the majority that the
danger of vaccination is minimal, the parent might agree that the risk
is worth running for the sake of everyone, including his own child. I
do not consider such a disagreement, though passionately disputed by
the parent, to represent Leiter's categorical demand.
We are now in a position to evaluate preliminarily the differences
between the Pro-Religion Equality Project and the Anti-Religion
Equality Project, though the differences will become clearer in the
rest of this article. At this point, we can see that the equality of value
between conscientious commitment grounded in traditional organized
religion and other forms of conscientious commitment that is so
important to Leiter is retained in the Pro-Religion Equality Project.
But the treatment of this equality as representing a religious
continuum changes Leiter's context. Specifically, the Pro-Religion
Equality Project, because it utilizes the terminology of religion, is
firmly grounded in the constitutional and statutory religion texts that
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already exist to protect liberty,260 which is not the case with regard to
conscience exemptions generally. 261
In addition, the commitment to moral realism provides a groundone which is not available to Leiter since he rejects moral
realism262-upon which one can support robust protection of religious
exemptions from generally applicable laws even when those
exemptions impose some burdens on others. The ground for that
protection is the possible truth of the religious claim, not just the
effect of violating conscience on the claimant herself. The existence
of religious exemptions can now reflect the judgment by the majority
that the majority may be wrong in its demands. Leiter acknowledges
this epistemological possibility, but since he views religion as he
understands it to be insulated from reason and evidence,263 he
denigrates the likelihood of much insight into knowledge from
religious conscience.
Another advantage of the Pro-Religion Equality Project is that it
entirely sidesteps the issue of supernaturalism. Religion is more than
supernaturalism. Religion is more than the belief in a supreme being
independent of the material universe. Definitions of religion that
begin with supernaturalism in order to apply, or not apply, religious
exemptions are much too narrow to be of any use as principled
justification. 264
Finally, the greatest advantage of the Pro-Religion Equality Project
is that it is not really new. As we shall see in the next Part, this
approach is close to that of the Supreme Court in the Vietnam War
draft cases. And I would like to think that its broad and liberal
approach to religion is instinctively the default position of most
Americans concerning the meaning of religion.

260. These authoritative texts, such as the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, of course, refer to religion rather than conscience. See Tebbe, supra
note 225, at 1114 ("[R]eligious freedom laws typically reference religion alone.").
261. See id. ("Virtually everywhere that American law protects free exercise and nonestablishment it focuses on religion.").
262. LEITER, supra note 2, at 101 n.12.
263. /d. at 33-35.
264. Nelson Tebbe, for example, in studying nonbelievers describes the subject of study as
follows in a section entitled Who Are Nonbelievers?: "When I refer to nonbelievers
here, I mean to include people who take negative or skeptical positions on the
existence of superhuman beings and supernatural powers." Tebbe, supra note 225, at
1117. But Tebbe states that this is not a definition. !d. at 1117 n.21. There are many
definitions of religion, only some of which begin with the supernatural or the
superhuman. !d. at 1134 & n.102.
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VI. THE VIETNAM DRAFT CASES
There is a good reason why Professor Paulsen referred to, and
criticized, the Vietnam War draft cases in his argument for a
narrowly defmed religious foundation for religious liberty. 265 For in
those cases, United States v. Seeger/ 66 Welsh v. United States/ 67 and
Gillette v. United States, 268 the Supreme Court set forth a very
inclusive understanding of the meaning and scope of religious
belief. 269 It is this inclusive vision that some traditional religious
believers object to as a threat to the protection of genuine religious
liberty. 270
Seeger is probably the most thorough exploration of theology that
the Supreme Court has ever undertaken. The context of the case
concerned three claimants of conscientious objector status during the
Vietnam draft era: Daniel Seeger, Arno Jakobson, and Forest Peter. 271
Congress had broadened the draft exemption statute to include
persons who "by reason of [their] religious training and belief, [are]
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." 272
Religious training and belief were defmed in the Act as "an
individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties
superior to those arising from any human relation, but does not
include essentially political, sociological or philosophical views or a
merely personal moral code."273
While the three claimants
challenged the constitutionality of this definition as excluding the
nonbeliever and some religious believers, Peter and Jakobson also
265. See Paulsen, supra note 159, at 1196.
266. 380 u.s. 163 (1965).
267. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
268. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
269. See id. at 450-51 (stating that, when raising an objection to military service on the
grounds of "religious training and belief," there is no requirement of a "particular
sectarian affiliation or theological position"); Welsh, 398 U.S. at 340 (finding that
petitioner was entitled to a conscientious exemption under the Universal Military
Training and Service Act because petitioner's beliefs, albeit unorthodox, "function[ed]
as a religion in his life"); Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176, 183-84 (constructing the term
"religious training and belief' in the Universal Military Training and Service Act, to
include beliefs that are not traditional beliefs in God).
270. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165-66 (holding that a person may be exempted under the
Universal Military Training and Service Act by having a belief "that is sincere and
meaningful" which "occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled
by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption.");
Paulsen, supra note 159, at 1203.
271. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 1~9.
272. Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 456G) (1958).
273. !d.; Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165.
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claimed that their beliefs met the statutory definition. 274 The Court
held in a unanimous opinion by Justice Clark, one later repudiated by
Justice Harlan, 275 that all three claimants met the statutory definition,
thus avoiding any constitutional issue. 276
Justice Clark first held that Congress had not intended to distinguish
between theistic and nontheistic religious beliefs: by using the term
Supreme Being rather than God, Congress had intended "to embrace all
religions." 277 And Congress had, further, not restricted the scope of
religion that could ground a legitimate application for conscientious
objector status. 278 The proper test of religion for purposes of the statute
"is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a
place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox
belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption."279
As became clear later in the opinion, the reason the Justices felt
they could not distinguish between traditional theism and non-theism
was the broad interpretation that modem theology applies to the
meaning of God. 280 Justice Clark concluded that God does not just
mean the orthodox God, but "the broader concept of a power or
being, or a faith, 'to which all else is subordinate or upon which all
else is ultimately dependent. "'281 And the reason that religion tends
to be defined so generously is that, for Justice Clark, religion is that
realm of experience "dealing with the fundamental questions of
man's predicament in life." 282
The opinion's broad approach to defming religious belief for
purposes of conscientious objector status was said to "embrace[] the
ever-broadening understanding of the modem religious
community."283 Justice Clark quoted the theologian Paul Tillich,
Bishop John Robinson, Vatican II, and, perhaps most revealingly for
a broad definition of religion, David Muzzey, "a leader in the Ethical
Culture Movement."284 For Muzzey, "[e]verybody except the
[comparatively few] avowed atheists . . . believes in some kind of
274. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165.
275. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 344 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
276. See Matthew G. Lindenbaum, Religious Conscientious Objection and the
Establishment Clause in the Rehnquist Court: Seeger, Welsh, Gillette, and § 6(j)
Revisited, 36 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 237, 242-43 (2003).
277. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165.
278. !d. at 176.
279. !d. at 165-66.
280. See id. at 180-83.
281. !d. at 174 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
282. /d.
283. !d. at 180.
284. !d. at 180-82.
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God . . . ." 285 Justice Clark had previously noted in the opinion that
"[n]o party claims to be an atheist or attacks the statute on this
ground. " 286 In a similar tone, the opinion quoted Tillich as referring
to the God above the God of theism, "the seriousness of that doubt in
is
affirmed" 287
which
meaning
within
meaninglessness
What can we learn about the nature of religion from the Tillich
The
quotation about "meaning within meaninglessness?"288
challenge for the Western nonbeliever is that without the personal,
supernatural, creator God of the Bible-what Justice Clark
presumably meant by the "orthodox belief in God" 289 and what
Justice Scalia would later denominate "the God of monotheism" in
the McCreary County Ten Commandments case290-the nonbeliever
struggles to justify the belief that anything whatever is of real value.
If everything is a cosmic accident, without plan or guiding
intelligence and purpose, then is not everything meaningless? To put
this another way, the nonbeliever can obviously be good without
God, as the humanist chaplain Greg Epstein argues, 291 but can a
nonbeliever be good without objective good?
What Tillich is suggesting, and apparently the Court agreed with
him, is that the faith that there is meaning in existence is one way of
describing belief in God itself. 292 Many people who count themselves
as nonbelievers could legitimately be considered religious, and
indeed could even be considered believers in God, for purposes of the
statute and for other purposes as well. The marker of religious belief
thus becomes a commitment to sincere and serious, in the sense of
demanding, moral realism, just as suggested in this article.
Justice Douglas's concurrence in Seeger pointed to Hinduism and
Buddhism to illustrate the breadth of the concept of a Supreme
Being. 293 He concluded that the words Supreme Being should be
construed to "include the cosmos, as well as an anthropomorphic
entity."294 To attribute to Congress a narrow, parochial view of the
285. /d. at 182 (quoting DAVIDS. MUZZEY, ETHICS AS A RELIGION 86-87 (1st ed. 1951)).
286. /d. at 173.
287. /d. at 180 (quoting 2 PAUL TILLICH, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY: EXISTENCE AND THE
CHRIST 12 (1957)).
288. /d.
289. /d. at 166.
290. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 893 n.3 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
291. GREG M. EPSTEIN, GOOD WITHOUT Goo: WHAT A BILLION NONRELIGIOUS PEOPLE DO
BELIEVE, at X (2009).
292. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 180, 184, 186-88.
293. /d. at 189 (Douglas J., concurring).
294. /d. at 188.
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term Supreme Being would create constitutional difficulties because
Congress would be favoring one religious faith over another. 295
Douglas noted, as did the majority opinion, that none of the claimants
"comes to us an avowedly irreligious person or as an atheist." 296
Since there is no longer a draft, we do not have to be concerned
with the legitimate question of whether the Court was playing fast
and loose with the statute in Seeger. 297 At one point in the opinion,
Justice Clark even appears to misstate the wording of Section 6(j). 298
The point for our purposes is not whether the statute was fairly
interpreted, but what it means to be religious. Christopher Hitchens
is a good example of someone who believed passionately that human
life was meaningful despite not believing in God; 299 Sam Harris,
another of the New Atheists, in his recent book about the reality of
good and evil, The Moral Landscape, is another. 300 Such persons can
be viewed as religious from the point of view of the definition in
Seeger because they affirm meaning within meaninglessness.
Of course, Seeger was not the last word in the line of draft cases. 301
Congress amended the statute two years after the Seeger opinion to
remove reference to the words "Supreme Being" as defining the
meaning of religious training and belief.3°2 As Louis Fisher put it,
"what the Court in effect deleted, Congress deleted in fact." 303 This
295.
296.
297.

298.

299.
300.

301.
302.

303.

See id.
!d. at 193.
See Major William D. Palmer, Time to Exorcise Another Ghost From the Vietnam
War: Restructuring the In-Service Conscientious Objector Program, 140 MIL. L. REv.
179, 200-01 (1993); R. Norman Moody, After 40 Years, Return of Military Draft Not
in
Sight,
FL.
TODAY,
July
23,
2013,
http://www.floridatoday.com/article/20 130723/NEWSO 11307230013/1 006/rssO 1/After
-40-years-return-military-draft-not-sight.
See Palmer, supra note 297, at 200 ("Early in the opinion, Justice Clark gave an
indication of the care with which he intended to treat the words and intent of Congress
when he substituted the word 'economic' for 'philosophical' in the statute's list of
beliefs that would not qualify for the exemption.").
See generally HiTCHENS, supra note 132 (arguing that religion is man-made and that
human decency is not derived from religion).
See SAM HARRIS, THE MORAL LANDSCAPE: How SCIENCE CAN DETERMINE HUMAN
VALUES 2 (2010); Simon Hooper, The Rise of the 'New Atheists', CNN (Nov. 9, 2006
10:06 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/11/08/atheism.feature/index.html.
See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 335-36 (1970).
See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165 (majority opinion); compare Military Selective Service
Act, Pub. L. No. 90-40, § 7, 81 Stat. 100, 104 (1967) (omitting "Supreme Being" from
the Act), with Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1958)
(including "Supreme Being" in the Act).
Louis Fisher, Nonjudicial Safeguards for Religious Liberty, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 31, 58
(2001).
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change did not figure directly in the Court's next case, Welsh, but on
the other hand, the statutory change must have been viewed by some
of the Justices as supportive of the general approach in Seeger, an
approach upon which the Welsh plurality relied to an overwhelming
degree. 304
In Welsh, there was no majority to reaffirm the Seeger language. 305
Only three other Justices-Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall-joined
Justice Black's plurality opinion. 306 Justice Harlan concurred in the
result, expressly repudiating his vote in Seeger, 307 and three Justices
dissented: Justice White joined by Justice Stewart and Chief Justice
Burger. 308 The decision to dissent by Justices White and Stewart,
along with the concurrence by Justice Harlan, indicated that three of
the original votes in Seeger either now disagreed with that approach
or were at least unwilling to reaffirm it. 309
For Justice Black, Welsh essentially was Seeger, so no expansion
of the approach taken in Seeger was necessary to reverse Welsh's
conviction for refusing to be inducted:
The controlling facts in this case are strikingly similar
to those in Seeger. Both Seeger and Welsh were
brought up in religious homes and attended church in
their childhood, but in neither case was this church
one which taught its members not to engage in war at
any time for any reason. Neither Seeger nor Welsh
continued his childhood religious ties into his young
manhood, and neither belonged to any religious group
or adhered to the teachings of any organized religion
during the period of his involvement with the
Selective Service System. At the time of registration
for the draft, neither had yet come to accept pacifist
principles. Their views on war developed only in
subsequent years, but when their ideas did fully
mature both made application to their local draft
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

See Welsh, 398 U.S. at 343; Seeger, 380 U.S. at 185-86.
See Welsh, 398 U.S. at 335, 344 (5-3 decision) (Harlan, J., concurring).
See id. at 335.
See id. at 344-45.
See id. at 367 (White, J., dissenting).
Justice White's dissent indicated scant support for Seeger: "Whether or not United
States v. Seeger . . . accurately reflected the intent of Congress in providing draft
exemptions for religious conscientious objectors to war, I cannot join today's
construction ofs 6(j) .... " !d. at 367 (citation omitted).
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boards for conscientious objector exemptions from
military service under s 6(j) of the Universal Military
Training and Service Act. ...
In filling out their exemption applications both Seeger

and Welsh were unable to sign the statement that, as
printed in the Selective Service form, stated 'I am, by
reason of my religious training and belief,
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any
form.' Seeger could sign only after striking the words
'training and' and putting quotation marks around the
word 'religious.' Welsh could sign only after striking
the words, 'my religious training and.' On those same
applications, neither could defmitely affirm nor deny
that he believed in a 'Supreme Being,' both stating
that they preferred to leave the question open. But
both Seeger and Welsh affirmed on those applications
that they held deep conscientious scruples against
taking part in wars where people were killed.
Both
strongly believed that killing in war was wrong,
unethical, and immoral, and their consciences forbade
them to take part in such an evil practice. Their
objection to participating in war in any form could not
be said to come from a 'still, small voice of
conscience'; rather, for them that voice was so loud
and insistent that both men preferred to go to jail
rather than serve in the Armed Forces.
There was
never any question about the sincerity and depth of
Seeger's convictions as a conscientious objector, and
the same is true of Welsh. 310
Justice Black rejected the attempt by the government to distinguish
Welsh from Seeger on the grounds first, that Welsh was more
insistent than Seeger that his views were not religious and second,
that Welsh's views were essentially political, sociological, or
philosophical or constituted a merely personal moral code, which the
statute expressly forbade as a basis for exemption. 311 As to the first
ground, Justice Black reasoned that an applicant for exemption might
not be familiar with "the broad scope of the word 'religious' as used
in s 6(j)," and in any event, Welsh had written a letter to the Appeal
310. Id. at 335-37 (majority opinion).
311. See id. at 341-43.
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Board stating that "his beliefs were 'certainly religious in the ethical
sense of the word. "'312 As to the second ground, Justice Black
admitted that these factors did influence Welsh, as they had Seeger,
but the exclusion applied only to applicants for exemption whose
views do not rest "at all upon moral, ethical, or religious principle but
instead rest solely upon considerations of policy, pragmatism, or
expediency."313
As the above quote suggests, Justice Black's approach did in fact
broaden the formula in Seeger by its emphasis on the moral and
ethical as grounds of religious belief. The test of exemption for
Justice Black in Welsh was stated as follows:
What is necessary under Seeger for a registrant's
conscientious oojection to all war to be 'religious"
within the meaning of s 6G) is that this opposition to
war stem from the registrant's moral, ethical, or
religious beliefs about what is right and wrong and
that these beliefs be held with the strength of
traditional religious convictions. 314
As shown above, the actual Seeger test did not mention the moral or
ethical as permitted sources for religious views independent of
religion itself. 315 The test applied in Seeger used the word "belief''
without indicating any source. 316 By using the words moral and
ethical, in addition to the word religious, to describe the kind of belief
that could ground the exemption, Justice Black was theoretically
permitting claimants to deny that they were religious and to claim
that their pacifism was rooted in morality and ethics, not religion. 317
However, this expansion of the test for religion was not the reason
Justice Harlan rejected the statutory test in Seeger that he had earlier
supported. 318 While Justice Harlan did note that the plurality now
allowed "beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source" to qualify
for the exemption, and that this approach eliminated the statutory
requirement of a religious content for the exemption,319 he stated, in
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

Id. at 341.
!d. at 342-43.
!d. at 339-40.
See id. at 339 (quoting United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965)).
!d. (quoting Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176).
See id. at 339-40.
See id. at 344-54 (Harlan, J., concurring).
!d. at 345.
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obvious criticism, that the Court in Seeger had earlier "embrac[ed] a
secular definition of religion" that conflicted with Congress'
language and intent. 320
Why, then, did Justice Harlan concur in the reversal of Welsh's
conviction? Justice Harlan was of the view that Congress had made
two distinctions, both of which violated the Constitution. First,
Congress recognized only conscientious objection grounded on
religion, as opposed to "secular beliefs."321 That choice violated the
Establishment Clause. 322 Second, Congress distinguished between
theistic and nontheistic religion, which also violated the
Establishment Clause. 323
What was the difference for Justice Harlan between religious
beliefs and the "inner ethical voice that bespeaks secular and not
'religious' reflection"324 that Congress had unconstitutionally
excluded from the statutory exemption? Justice Harlan never clearly
distinguished the secular from the religious, but he did note that, to be
constitutional, the statute must include exemption for beliefs that
"emanate from a purely moral, ethical or philosophical source"
(which the statute expressly excluded) and must be religiously neutral
in the sense that it includes "conscience" as a basis for its
application. 325
Justice Harlan's views on the meaning of religion are nuanced. He
did distinguish religious reasons from secular reasons and was of the
view that to benefit the former and not the latter would violate the
Establishment Clause as not religiously neutral. 326 On the other hand,
he was willing to live with the expansion of the term religious in the
Welsh plurality to include both religious and secular grounds for
pacifism even though this definition still excluded some people
opposed to all war-those opposed to war on grounds of
pragmatism. 327 That exclusion from conscientious objector status did
not violate the Establishment Clause for Justice Harlan. 328

320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

/d. at 353.
!d. at 356.
See id. at 356-57.
See id.
/d. at 357.
!d. at 358 & n.9.
See id. at 356 (explaining that were Congress to "draw the line between theistic and
nontheistic religious beliefs on the one hand and secular beliefs on the other," such
distinctions would not be compatible with the Establishment Clause).
327. /d. at 359 n.IO.
328. !d.
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Justice White's dissent took issue with the plurality on grounds
similar to those of Justice Harlan-that the plurality had not followed
the text and intention behind the statutory exemption. 329 The dissent
took issue with Justice Harlan, however, concerning whether
exempting only religious grounds for objection to war violates the
Establishment Clause and whether, even if it did, this infirmity
should result in extending the statutory exemption to a nonreligious
objector such as Welsh.
The third case of what are usually considered the Vietnam draft
trilogy is Gillette, which raised the issue of conscientious objection to
a particular war-in this case the Vietnam War. 330 The claimants in
Gillette were Guy Gillette, whose views were "based on a humanist
approach to religion," and who was convicted for failure to report for
induction, and Louis Negre, "a devout Catholic," who was relying on
a "just" war theory and who sought habeas corpus for discharge after
induction and orders to report to Vietnam. 331 Justice Marshall noted
that, in both instances, there was no doubt about the sincerity or
religious character of the claimants' objections to the Vietnam
War. 332
Justice Marshall's majority opinion first rejected arguments that the
statutory exemption reaches conscientious objector to a particular
war. 333 Not surprisingly, given the text, the Court ruled that it did
not. 334
The more significant argument was that the statute, construed as
applying only to the conscientious objection to all wars, violates "the
religious clauses of the First Amendment."335 Justice Marshall
interpreted the challenge as primarily an Establishment Clause issue
that Congress was "impermissibly discriminat[ing] among types of
religious belief and affiliation. " 336
Justice Marshall admitted that insofar as the claimants' beliefs in
Gillette were religious, the nature of their religious beliefs was the
329.

330.
.331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

See id. at 367 (White, J., dissenting) ("I cannot join today's construction of § 6(j)
extending draft exemption to those who disclaim religious objections to war and
whose views about war represent a purely personal code arising not from religious
training and belief as the statute requires but from readings in philosophy, history, and
sociology.").
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437,439 (1971) .
!d. at 439-41 (internal quotation marks omitted).
!d. at 440.
See id. at 447.
See id.
!d. at 448.
!d. at 449.
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reason their claims failed while other, different religious beliefs
qualified for conscientious objector status. 337 But the statutory
restriction of conscientious objector status to objection to all war
rather than particular wars is religiously neutral, as required by the
Establishment Clause. There was no violation because the distinction
Congress used-selective objection versus objection to war in any
form-does not itself distinguish among religious beliefs. 338 The
distinction pointed to by the claimants is a "de facto discrimination"
because some religions permit participation in just wars only. 339
While that does not automatically undermine the constitutional
challenge, the existence of valid secular purposes for the
Congressional policy recognizing conscientious objector status for
objectors to all wars and for limiting that exemption to just that
orientation are sufficient to uphold the statute against such a de facto
challenge. 340 The main justification for the limit is the interest in
fairness and the danger of erratic or discriminatory decisions if
opposition to particular wars were permitted to ground the
conscientious objector classification. 341 The objection to particular
wars is ultimately subjective. 342
The claimants also raised a Free Exercise claim that "conscripting
persons who oppose a particular war on grounds of conscience and
religion" violates the Constitution. 343 Here Justice Marshall found the
government's interest outweighed the religious interest at issue:
The conscription laws, applied to such persons as to
others, are not designed to interfere with any religious
ritual or practice, and do not work a penalty against
any theological position. The incidental burdens felt
by persons in petitioners' position are strictly justified
by substantial governmental interests that relate
directly to the very impacts questioned. And more
broadly, of course, there is the Government's interest
in procuring the manpower necessary for military
purposes, pursuant to the constitutional grant of power
to Congress to raise and support armies. Art. I, s 8. 344
337. See id. at 449-50.
338. See id. at 450--51.
339. !d. at 451-52.
340. See id. at 452-53.
341. See id. at 455.
342. See id. at 456.
343. !d. at 461.
344. !d. at 462.
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The Justices in Gillette were not unanimous. 345 Justice Black
concurred in the judgment and joined only Part I of the opinion-the
rejection of the statutory claim. 346 Justice Douglas dissented, but
agreed with the Court that selective objection does not meet the
statutory definition of conscientious objection. 347
In terms of the understanding of what it means to be religious,
Gillette is mixed. Though the issue was not before the Court, neither
the majority opinion nor any other opinion in the case questioned
whether Gillette's "humanist approach to religion" qualified as
religious for purposes of the statutory exemption. Both Gillette and
Negre (who was raising religious claims specifically under his
Catholic religious training) were permitted to question whether the
statute could be interpreted to reach their claims of objection to
particular wars. 348
On the other hand, in discussing the Free Exercise challenge to the
statute, the majority only made the "assumption" that Gillette's and
Negre's "beliefs concerning war have roots that are 'religious' in
nature within the meaning of the Amendment as well as this Court's
decisions construing s 6(j)" rather than holding that they did. 349 This
reservation; if that is what it was, would have been aimed at Gillette
rather than Negre, since obviously Roman Catholic teachings are
religious by any definition.
In addition, Justice Douglas, in dissenting from the Free Exercise
holding, distinguished carefully between Negre and Gillette. 350
Justice Douglas would have upheld both their claims of conscientious
objection to particular wars. 351 But Justice Douglas' conclusion with
regard to Negre was straightforward: "Negre is opposed under his
religious training and beliefs to participation in any form in the war in
Vietnam."352 In contrast, for the humanist Gillette, the route to the
same conclusion was more contorted:
It is true that the First Amendment speaks of the free

exercise of religion, not of the free exercise of
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.

See id. at 463,470 (8-1 decision).
See id. at 441, 447,463.
See id. at 463 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
See id. at 439-41 (majority opinion).
Id. at 449.
See id. at 463-75 (Douglas, J. dissenting).
Id. at 463, 470,475.
Id. at 475.
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conscience or belief. Yet conscience and belief are the
main ingredients of First Amendment rights. They are
the bedrock of free speech as well as religion. The
implied First Amendment right of "conscience" 1s
certainly as high as the "right of association" ...
Conscience is often the echo of religious faith. But, as this case
illustrates, it may also be the product of travail, meditation, or sudden
revelation related to a moral apprehension of the dimensions of a
problem, not to a religion in the ordinary sense. 353 So, Justice
Douglas perhaps did not regard the defmition of religion to be as
broad as did the majority opinion in Seeger that he had joined.
Something in Gillette's beliefs called forth from him a distinction
between religion and conscience that those of Seeger did not.
Before concluding this section concerning the approach of the
Supreme Court, I need to address the claim sometimes put forth that
the Justices narrowed their understanding of religion from the breadth
exhibited in Seeger in Wisconsin v. Yoder in 1972. 354 In Yoder
members of the Amish faith were convicted under Wisconsin's
compulsory school attendance statute for refusing to send their
children to school beyond the eighth grade. 355 They challenged their
convictions on the ground that their free exercise rights were
violated. 356 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, did not
specify a definition of religion, but stated "[t]hat the record in this
case abundantly supports the claim that the traditional way of life of
the Amish is not merely a matter of personal preference, but one of
deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and
intimately related to daily living."357 Justice Burger examined the
belief of the Amish that salvation requires living separate and apart
from the influences of the modem world, based on a literal reading of
the Apostle Paul's command, "be not conformed to this world . . .
358
•"
The Yoder majority opinion did not mention the Seeger/Welsh
definition ofreligion. 359 In his dissent, Justice Douglas suggested that
the majority opinion was contrary to Seeger/Welsh/ 60 which is
undoubtedly why Yoder is sometimes read that way.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.

!d. at 465-66.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Id. at 207-08.
See id. at 208-09.
Jd. at 216.
Jd. at 210, 216.
Though Justice Harlan's opinion in Welsh was cited in Yoder. Jd. at 215 n.6.
ld. at 247-48 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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But the dispute between Justice Douglas and Justice Burger is by
no means clear. Here is the actual quote by Justice Burger and
Justice Douglas' response:
[W]e must be careful to determine whether the Amish
religious faith and their mode of life are, as they claim,
inseparable and interdependent.
A way of life,
however virtuous and admirable, may
not
be
interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of
education if it is based on purely secular
considerations; to have the protection of the Religion
Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief.
Although a determination of what is a "religious"
belief or practice entitled to constitutional protection
may present a most delicate question, the very concept
of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to
make his own standards on matters of conduct m
which society as a whole has important interests.
Thus, if the Amish asserted their claims because of
their subjective evaluation and rejection of the
contemporary secular values accepted by the majority,
much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time
and isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims
would not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's choice
was philosophical and personal rather than religious,
and such belief does not rise to the demands of the
Religion Clauses. 361
Now, the first question we might ask is whether Thoreau would
disagree with Justice Burger. Thoreau was no fan of what we
ordinarily call conscience, though he might have agreed that his
choices were personal and philosophical and not religious. 362
361.
362.

!d. at 215-16 (majority opinion) (footnote omitted).
Here is an excerpt from the poem At/an tides:
Conscience is instinct bred in the house,
Feeling and Thinking propagate the sin
By an unnatural breeding in and in.
I say, Tum it out doors,
Into the moors.
HENRY DAVID THOREAU, ATLANTIDES, reprinted in HENRY DAVID THOREAU:
COLLECTED ESSAYS AND POEMS 615 (Elizabeth Hall Witherell ed., 2001 ).

60

University of Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 43

In response to Justice Burger, Justice Douglas quoted from the
Seeger opinion-pointing to the "place parallel to that filled by the
God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption" language to
try to show that Justice Burger had improperly narrowed the
definition of religion. 363 Suffice it to say that this exchange did not
settle anything. Justice Burger did not repudiate the Seeger opinion's
language and the application of that language to Thoreau presents a
nice question that tossed off dicta on either side could not resolve.
The place we end up from this short examination of case law is not
another attempt to define religion as such. Rather it is this: the Court
in this series of cases allows for a distinction between the secular and
the religious, particularly as the religious serves as a ground for
fundamental opposition to the policies of the state. Insofar as that
opposition rests on a personal judgment weighing policy values
differently from the balance set by the majority, there is nothing
religious; there is merely the stuff of winning and losing in politics
itself.
But insofar as that opposition rests on a different level of personal
identity that the person experiences as compulsive rather than chosen,
whether that compulsion is experienced from the outside or the
inside, the objector may be said to stand in religious opposition to the
state. That compulsion is grounded in the objective reality of
meaning, which is why religion is never a matter of choice. As
Douglas Laycock puts it:
[t]he nontheist's belief in transcendent moral
obligations-in obligations that transcend his selfinterest and his personal preferences and which he
experiences as so strong that he has no choice but to
comply-is analogous to the transcendent moral
obligations that are part of the cluster of theistic
beliefs that we recognize as religious. 364
My only hesitance regarding Laycock's statement is that calling
this a nontheistic belief may confuse the issue. The belief in
transcendent obligations reaches all the way to many persons
conventionally thought of, and often self-described as, nonbelievers.
They are to be considered religious as well.

363.
364.

Wisconsin, 406 U.S. at 248 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965)).
Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 336
(1996).
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In none of these cases is there a requirement of belief in a personal
God or a supernatural realm before one can be considered religious.
In none of these cases is there a requirement of a body of fellow
practitioners or a regimen of ceremonial customs. Nor is there a
requirement of texts. What there is, is the sense that one's identity is
at risk and at stake in the felt obligation at issue. Not every religion
functions as commandment. But every religious belief makes
demands.
The Pro-Religion Equality Project provides an overall
understanding of the relationship between conscience claims by
traditional religious believers and conscience claims by persons who
are not a part Of traditional religion. The Vietnam Draft cases
manifest that understanding, or something like it, and set forth a
framework for applying that understanding in the context of broadly
interpreted religious exemption provisions.
Before discussing
objections to that framework in Part VII, it is necessary to consider
briefly the alternative to broadly interpreted religious exemption
provisions: conscience clauses that also provide for exemptions from
generally applicable laws.
VII. THE LIMITATIONS OF CONSCIENCE CLAUSES
The fundamental objection to the Vietnam draft cases, on both
sides, is that the cases defmed religion too broadly. From the
nonbeliever side, the harm of such a defmition, aside from the fact
that it is in some sense false, is that it includes nonbelievers in a
realm that they may sincerely reject. 365 We are not religious,
nonbelievers might say.
From the believer side, the broad understanding of religion may not
only be false to their understanding of their own position and of
reality, but may devalue the stakes involved in considering religion
and religious exemptions from the commands of the state. 366 Broad
definitions of religion inevitably dilute religious liberty claims by
allowing other kinds of claims to be raised. 367 They are not religious,
believers might say.
In principle, each side might simply reject recognition of the need
for any exemptions from the commands of the state. For the
365. See supra notes 129-51 and accompanying text.
366. See Donald L. Beschle, Does a Broad Free Exercise Right Require a Narrow
Definition ofReligion?, 39 HASTINGS CaNST. L.Q. 357, 372-73 (2011) (describing the
fear that a broad definition of religion could lead to insincere requests for
exemptions).
367. /d.
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nonbeliever, the state's command might be morally wrong, but the
answer to that would be some form of struggle against it. For the
believer, the state's command might controvert religious truth, but
the answer would be martyrdom. These responses are not entirely
different from each other.
In practice, however, that has not been the position of believers or
nonbelievers.
Historically, nonbelievers have been willing to
recognize religious exemptions to some extent, which is why
Congress passed the RFRA practically unanimously. 368 Recently,
however, as described above, nonbelievers have been arguing that
religious exemptions per se are unjustified and discriminatory. 369
Conscience exemptions, available to all, should be substituted.
Donald Beschle takes this position, for example. 370 Leiter takes this
position, but then really argues against all exemptions from generally
applicable law. 371
Believers have also historically favored religious exemptions. 372 In
response to the challenge by nonbelievers to religious exemptions,
some believers have argued that religious claims to exemption are
different from those of secular conscience. 373 Professor Paulsen takes
that position, for example. 374 That does not necessarily mean that
such believers oppose conscience clauses, only that they want
religious exemptions to be treated separately. Of course, such
believers may suspect that even differentiated conscience clauses
would inevitably dilute claims of strictly religious liberty.
What I hope to show in this Part is that, contra to some
nonbelievers, conscience clauses should not be added to religious
exemptions or substituted for them, and therefore the claims of
nonbelievers for exemption should be included within religious
liberty claims, as occurred in the draft cases above. The objections of
believers to that proposal will be taken up in the next Part.
Let me illustrate the problem of robust conscience clauses, by
which I mean conscience clauses that will actually exempt some

See Ledewitz, Experimenting with Religious Liberty, supra note 113, (describing
adoption of the RFRA).
369. See supra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
370. See Beschle, supra note 366, at 390.
371. See LEITER, supra note 2, at 93-104.
372. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1972) (seeking a religious
exemption from having to comply with a compulsory school attendance statute as the
law is contrary to Amish values).
373. See Paulsen, supra note 159, at 1203-{)4 (explaining that religious obligations are
different from moral belief systems that have no concept of God).
374. !d.
368.
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claimants despite the burden this may sometimes place on others and
despite the harms that exemptions may create, by contrasting the Air
Force yarmulke case, Goldman v. Weinberger375 with conscience
exemptions from mandatory child vaccination laws. I am not
claiming to have exhausted all the different ways that either religious
exemptions or conscience clauses can be conceptualized or can
operate. What follows is a brief attempt to set forth one kind of
contrast-that is, one way that religious exemptions can be contrasted
with conscience clauses.
In Goldman, an Air Force regulation mandating uniform dress for
Air Force personnel was applied to a rabbi, thereby preventing him
from wearing a yarmulke, a religious requirement for Orthodox Jews
under certain circumstances. 376 The Air Force was enforcing a
"strong interest in discipline," rather than any form of religious
discrimination, 377 and there was no question of the sincerity of
Goldman's religious practice.
In a situation like this, the
government's interest is entirely valid, but the weight of that interest
falls vastly disproportionately on religious minorities whose interests
in this context the majority is unlikely to value fairly. 378 In other
words, religious liberty functions here similarly to the way that Equal
Protection law and other anti-discrimination principles function for
other types of minorities. 379
Importantly, Goldman was not implicitly cntlctzmg the
government's interest or its practice of uniformity regarding everyone
else. He was not attempting to reweigh a policy result. While the
Court rejected Goldman's claim, the reason stated was the unusual
necessity of not forcing the military to make exceptions to its uniform
discipline policy, not necessarily rejecting this kind of claim in all
future contexts. 380
Much of the Free Exercise case law can be viewed in similar
fashion: not wishing to work on a day that is not the Sabbath for most
people or the use of a forbidden substance for ceremonial purposes
and so forth. The interest of the individual in maintaining the
375. 475 U.S. 503, 504 (1986).
376. !d. at 504--05.
377. /d. at 504. Actually, reading between the lines, there seemed to be evidence that
enforcement of the Air Force regulation amounted to illegal retaliation, a point that
did not escape Justice Stevens' concurrence. /d. at 511 (Stevens, J., concurring).
378. See id. at 523-24 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
379. See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARv. L. REv. 747, 764-65
(20 II) (comparing equal protection and free exercise jurisprudence).
380. See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 509-10 (majority opinion).
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religious practice is very great compared to the government's interest
in uniform enforcement of an otherwise valid policy and is of a
different nature than is the government's interest in universal
enforcement. 381 There is harm from granting an exemption, but that
harm can sometimes be outweighed by the interest of the claimant. 382
Now, in contrast, consider the various forms of exemptions from
mandatory child vaccination laws. Three types of exemptions to
mandatory vaccination laws are typical: medical and religious, which
are practically universal among the states, and philosophical, which
are less common: 383
Virtually all states ... grant religious exemptions for
persons who have sincere religious beliefs in
opposition to immunization. Some statutes
require
parents to disclose their religion, while others are
more liberally worded. A minority of states also grant
exemptions for parents that profess philosophical
These
convictions in opposition to immunization.
statutes allow parents to object to vaccination because
of their "personal," "moral," or "other" beliefs. 384
According to Nancy Berlinger of the Hastings Center, these
exemptions operate as follows: medical exemptions apply to children
with medical conditions that weaken their immune systems, "making
routine immunizations risky"; religious exemptions apply to religious
practices such as a belief in "faith healing"; but the nonmedical,
nonreligious exemption claims tend to be by parents who:
have strong personal beliefs about the dangers of
vaccines; in particular, the belief that certain
childhood vaccines are linked to rising rates of autism.
This claim has been the subject of several studies by
the Institute of Medicine, which concluded that there
is no scientifically credible evidence to support it. But
two recent cases
involving
children
with
mitochondrial disorders who became seriously
ill
following vaccination-one child became autistic and
381.
382.
383.
384.

See id. at 523-24 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (holding that the Amish
interest in religious practices outweighs the state's interest in compulsory education).
See James G. Hodge, Jr. & Lawrence 0. Gostin, School Vaccination Requirements:
Historical, Social, and Legal Perspectives, 90 KY. L.J. 831, 873-74 (2002).
/d. at 874.
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Parents who fear immunization for safety reasons are usually
reweighing a policy decision that the majority, through expert
evidence, have decided differently. 386 The majority have decided that
immunization either does not cause harm or causes harm so
infrequently that the public health benefits of universal immunization
outweigh the risk. The minority that disagree with this judgment
have no special interest that the majority are likely to ignore. Many
of the voters who support universal immunization have children of
their own and are exceedingly unlikely to downplay the threat of
immunization to their own children.
The vaccination context, therefore, reflects an unusual political
situation in which the losers in a purely political struggle concerning
ordinary evaluations of consequences are permitted to opt out of the
requirements of a law. As strongly as some parents may feel about
vaccinations, this disagreement does not rise to the level of
conscience, as that term is usually understood-"'a sincere
conviction about what is morally required or forbidden. "'387 Granting
parents a conscience exemption under these circumstances is not
much different from allowing wealthy taxpayers to give themselves a
tax cut because they sincerely believe that lower taxes will lead to
economic growth and that higher taxes will harm everyone.

385. Nancy Berlinger, Conscience Clauses, Health Care Providers, and Parents, in From
Birth to Death and Bench to Clinic: The Hastings Center Bioethics Briefing Book for
Journalists, Policymakers, and Campaigns, HASTINGS CTR. 37 (2008),
http://www.thehastingscenter.org/uploadedFiles/Publications/Briefing_Book/conscien
ce%20clauses%20chapter.pdf.
386. !d. It is true that there could be other moral and ethical reasons for opposing
vaccination, such as the treatment of animals in the production and research of the
vaccine, but this is not typically the issue motivating parents. See also PAUL A. OFFIT,
DEADLY CHOICES: How THE ANTI-VACCINE MOVEMENT THREATENS Us ALL 121-22
(2011) (explaining that some anti-vaccine protestors argue that vaccinations are
unchristian in that two human cell strains taken from aborted fetuses have been used
to create vaccines); cf Art Caplan, Bioethicist: US Children Suffer from Vaccine
NBC
NEWS
(July
31,
2012,
8:29
AM),
Exemptions,
http://www.nbcnews.com/health/bioethicist-us-children-suffer-vaccine-exemptions917155 (opting out of vaccinations has become increasingly easy, as states accept
exemptions due to religion or other personal or philosophical reasons).
387. See Nadia N. Sawicki, The Hollow Promise of Freedom of Conscience, 33 CARDOZO
L. REv. 1389, 1395 (2012) (quoting Steven D. Smith, The Tenuous Case for
Conscience, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 325, 328 (2005)).
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I am not suggesting that vaccination conscience exemptions are a
bad policy; it may be that so many parents would resist vaccination
that law enforcement would collapse if a truly mandatory vaccination
policy were implemented. But I am suggesting that conscience
exemptions, in general, allow losers in a political struggle to reweigh
policy differences, threatening the breakdown of democratic
decision-making.
Therefore, religious exemptions are a vast
improvement over conscience exemptions.
I know of one example of my argument in practice. Allegheny
County, where I live, has adopted exemptions to its Health
Department Mandatory Vaccination Regulations that combine
traditional religious and conscience provisions:
1004. EXEMPTION FOR IMMUNIZATION.
A. Medical Exemption. Children need not be
immunized if a physician or his/her designee provides
a written Statement that immunization may be
detrimental to the health of the child. When the physician determines that immunization is no longer
detrimental to the health of the child, the child shall be
immunized according to this subchapter.
B. Religious Exemption. Children need not be
immunized if the parent, guardian, or emancipated
child objects in writing to the immunization on
religious grounds or on the basis of a strong moral or
ethical conviction similar to a religious belief. 388
The exemption is denominated "religious," but includes "a strong
moral or ethical conviction similar to a religious belief."389 This
exemption is not very different from the Seeger approach to religious
exemption, which included beliefs that were parallel to a traditional
belief in God, and to the Welsh plurality, which distinguished among
moral, ethical, and religious beliefs. 390
Undoubtedly, parents who believe vaccinations are dangerous to
their children are going to use this religious exemption, just as
parents in other states use broader conscience provisions.
Nevertheless, Allegheny County has presumably concluded that the
388. 28 PA. CODE§ 23.84(a}-{b) (2012).
389. /d. § 23.84(b).
390. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339, 342-43 (1970) (plurality opinion) (citing
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965)).
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use of the term "religious" will restrict mere policy disagreement to
some extent-that it will serve as some sort of check on exemption
claims. 391 I think that judgment is justified. There is a difference
between having to self-identify as having a religious objection and
having only to assert a conscience objection. My proposal for
religious exemptions in general would simply eliminate the words
"moral or ethical" altogether and allow the reference to religion to be
interpreted broadly to include moral and ethical commitments to the
objectivity of values.
Of course, some claimants will still utilize a religious exemption to
enforce their policy disagreements with mandatory vaccination laws;
however, others will respect a distinction between religious
commitment and their own policy-based objections to vaccinations
and will probably give in and follow the law.
In the end, conscience clauses exacerbate all the problems that
critics associate with broadly interpreted religious exemptions.
Religious exemptions invite such widespread noncooperation with
laws that they may prove impractical. But, at least religious
exemptions restrict such non-cooperation to deep differences of
values.
Conscience clauses do that as well, but also invite
noncooperation out of purely policy disagreements. They are,
therefore, not an alternative to religious exemptions, unless-like
Leiter--one anticipates that no or few exemptions will be actually be
granted.
VIII. OBJECTIONS TO THE PRO-RELIGION EQUALITY
PROJECT'S EXPANSION OF RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS
As seen above, the expansion of the reach of religious exemptions
proposed here does not go all the way to a recognition of conscience.
The claimant of a religious exemption must be willing to be
described as religious and must fit within a definition of religion,
even if that is an expanded definition. Donald Beschle has argued
that such a result "begins to resemble an individual right of
nullification."392 He has presented a constitutional interpretation to
limit that result by treating religion broadly, yet applying a standard
of less than the purported strict scrutiny associated with a pre-Smith
regime and statutory exemptions like RFRA. 393 It seems to me the
other way to limit that result is to retain the category of religion as the
391. See 28 PA. CODE§ 23.84(a}-(b).
392. Beschle, supra note 366, at 382.
393. !d. at 382-83.
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basis for exemption and to retain the structural limits on religion that
Seeger put forth.
But that structural limit is itself offensive to some on both sides of
the religious-nonreligious divide. The objection by nonbelievers to
being involuntarily included within religious exemptions was
adverted to above: we are not religious. And, it may be added, we
nonbelievers disagree that traditional religious claims of conscience
and nonreligious claims of conscience share the common ground that
the Pro-Religion Equality Project proposes. There is more to religion
than moral realism. There are non-rational elements to religion to
which we nonbelievers profoundly object.
This objection on the part of some nonbelievers will be deeply felt.
Opposition to, and separation from, traditional religion forms a deep
part of the identity of such persons. There is something insulting
about insisting to such a nonbeliever that her beliefs are "really
religious."
Nevertheless, the simple answer to this objection was already
anticipated by Justice Black's plurality opinion in Welsh, discussed
above. 394 In resisting self-identification as religious, Welsh, Justice
Black suggested, may simply not have understood the broad scope
the word religion had been given in the Supreme Court's treatment of
the draft exemption. 395 We can reinterpret Justice Black's point as
follows: an applicant for a religious exemption who hesitates to label
herself as religious is making a philosophical claim about the nature
of religion, rather than a legal argument. The defmition of religion,
for purposes of an exemption statute or the Free Exercise Clause, is
for the law to decide. If the law broadly interprets the word religion
so that it fits many people who have nothing to do with traditional
religion, the nonreligious claimant should have no hesitance in going
forward with the exemption claim, including using the word religious
to define the exemption claim.
Of course, it is not only nonbelievers who object to having to resort
to broad religious exemptions. 396 Some believers also object to the
use of broad religious exemptions. 397 Michael Paulsen argues that
religious exemptions are only coherent when they are understood to
rest on the claim that "true religious obligation is more important

394. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 341 (plurality opinion).
395. See id. at 341-42.
396. Paulsen, supra note 159, at 1188 n.51 (citing MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN
AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GoVERNMENT IN AMERlCAN CONSTITUTIONAL

HISTORY

397.

/d.

15 (1965)).
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than civil obligation."398 And by true religious obligations, Paulsen
means the assumption that God exists and that God's commands are
made known to the believer. 399 For Paulsen, religion in the
exemption context must be theistic. 400
While I believe that Paulsen's account fails as an actual description
of government granted religious exemptions from the law-and
Paulsen might agree with that because he calls his account a theory of
religious liberty and not a theory of government granted religious
freedom401 -I agree with him that for the believer, the commands of
God are superior to those of the state. That is true by definition, but
it is not important for our purposes. The believer does not need the
state's permission to obey God rather than man. The believer is
going to be willing to suffer almost any fate, and certainly any fate an
American government would impose, rather than disobey God.
I also agree with Paulsen that one can imagine some questions of
religious practice over which the state may be presumed to be
incompetent and over which the believer must be free to make his or
her own judgments. An example of such a religious question would
be how the mass is performed. In that kind of context, a theory of
two separate realms-civil and religious-is coherent. Insofar as the
framers of the Constitution accepted the two-realm theory, they
undoubtedly had these kinds of issues in mind.
But again, this concession does not implicate questions such as
laws touching on abortion, contraception, vaccination, hallucinogenic
drugs, and all the other areas in which the issue of religious
exemptions actually arise. In these fields, government is not
incompetent to legislate for the public good and is obviously not
going to cede to the religious dissenter the right to decide on her own
whether to obey the law.
Therefore, exemptions will be a
government policy rather than an inherent right of the believer. Even
if something that could be considered an inherent right is granted, as
some might consider the Free Exercise Clause to be, its protections
will still ultimately be enforced by an agent of the state-a judge.
Paulsen's understanding of religious exemptions fails to provide an
adequate framework for two reasons: his notion of God is too narrow
and his notion of transmission is too simple. Let me take the question
of transmission first. Even if God exists and makes demands, the
model of the believer bound by God rather than the state does not
398.
399.
400.
401.

!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.

at
at
at
at

1160.
1161, 1184 n.42.
1189.
1159-60.
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describe the usual situation of an exemption claimant. This error is
illustrated in the current controversy over the contraception mandate.
There is nothing in Christian scripture prohibiting the use of
contraceptives, which is why the official Roman Catholic position is
relatively unique among American Christians. 402 The interpretation
comes about from a sophisticated interpretation based on an evolving
tradition. Obviously I do not mean that it is for that reason a
misinterpretation of the Gospel, only that it might be. In any event,
the believer seeking a contraception exemption can be viewed as
obeying men, that is, Church officials, rather than God directly.
Church tradition rejects my conceptualization here because the
Church's teaching authority itself is believed to be divinely
inspired. 403 The Church does not make the distinction that the Jewish
tradition does in the Oven of Aknai story in which the human source
of interpretation, in contradistinction to the divine, is actually
celebrated. 404 Nevertheless, the model utilized by Paulsen of the
believer obeying God rather than the state is too simplistic.
The other, and more problematic, issue for Paulsen is his
understanding of God, the commands of God, and the nature of
theism. For Paulsen, it is because God makes demands on believers
that religious liberty requires the state to recognize religious
exemptions from law. 405
It is common today for lawyers to claim to know who God isJustice Scalia, for example, asks confidently "what other God (in the
singular, and with a capital G) there is, other than 'the God of
monotheism. "'406 But I am in the dark as to who this God is whom
Professor Paulsen so blithely invokes, whose commands are clear and
by whom one may easily distinguish believer from nonbeliever. Yes,
402.
403.

RAYMOND J. DEVETTERE, PRACTICAL DECISION MAKING IN HEALTH CARE ETHICS:
CASES AND CONCEPTS 264 (3d ed. 201 0).
See CATECHISM OF THECA THOLIC CHURCH § 113 (2d ed. 1995). That section reads:

Read the Scripture within "the living Tradition of the whole Church. "
According to a saying of the Fathers, Sacred Scripture is written
principally in the Church's heart rather than in documents and records,
for the Church carries in her Tradition the living memorial of God's
Word, and it is the Holy Spirit who gives her the spiritual interpretation
of the Scripture ("according to the spiritual meaning which the Spirit
grants to the Church").

/d.
404. See Bruce Ledewitz, The Openness ofTalmud, 41 DuQ. L. REv. 353, 356-57 (2003).
405. Paulsen, supra note 159, at 1160, 1162, 1183-84.
406. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 893 n.3 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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Elliott Welsh crossed out the word religious in his application for
draft exemption and described his opposition to war as founded on
history and sociology. 407 But he also claimed that his views were
"religious in the ethical sense of that word." 408
Jesus taught, not everyone who calls me Lord will enter the
Kingdom of Heaven but those who actually do the will of the
father. 409 Karl Barth said to the trade unionists that following Jesus
"is not a matter of believing in any particular set of ideas, including
Christian ones, but of actually following him, of building one's life
on the model of Jesus and relying on a connection to him." 4 I0 And
Dietrich Bonhoeffer told us that God was teaching us to get along
without him. 4 II Maybe it was Elliott Welsh who was the faithful
believer. Who can presume to say otherwise?
To put this another way, Paulsen invokes a being-like God--{)ne
who gives rather clear orders that the state sometimes contradicts.
Many believers, and even many Christians, reject this view of God in
principle.412 In Seeger, the Protestant theologian Paul Tillich did
so. 4 I3 But the Roman Catholic theologian Karl Rahner does as well:
"that God really does not exist who operates and functions as an
individual existent alongside of other existents, and who would then
as it were be a member of a larger household of all reality.'>4I 4
Instead, God is "the most radical, the most original, and in a certain
sense the most self-evident reality.'>4Is
Is it then false to say that God commands obedience? Not at all.
But as long as the claimant for exemption believes that obedience is
in fact commanded-that is, that certain behavior is obligatory
beyond the claimant's own judgment of policy-then all the law can
say is that this is equivalent to God' commanding this person to act.
Moral realism in this sense is all the law can require. From the law's
See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 341 (1970).
!d. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Matthew 7:21 (King James).
BRUCE LEDEWITZ, HALLOWED SECULARISM: THEORY, BELIEF, PRACTICE 73 (2009).
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, General Teachings/Activities, BIBLICAL DISCERNMENT
MINISTRIES, http://www.rapidnet.com/-jbeardlbdmlexposes/bonhoeffer/general.htm
(last modified Mar. 1996).
412. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 182-83 (1965) (quoting DAVIDS.
MUZZEY, ETHICS AS A RELIGION 86-87, 95,98 (1st ed. 1951) (discussing the belief of
God as a faith-based vision of humanity).
413. See id. at 180 (quoting 2 PAUL T!LLICH, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY: EXISTENCE AND THE
CHRIST 12 (1957)).
414. KARL RAHNER, FOUNDATIONS OF CHRISTIAN FAITH: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE IDEA OF
CHRISTIANITY 63 (William V. Dych trans., 1978).
415. Id.

407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
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perspective, the moral realist is religious and her claim to exemption
is religious. Anyone who disputes this, claiming that only she is
genuinely religious, is not only arrogant but deluded.
VIII. Implications of the Pro-Religion Equality Project
What difference will it make to our national life that many
nonbelievers might be considered religious from the point of view of
the Vietnam War draft cases? After all, the burning political/judicial
religious exemption issues of today are not likely to affect many
nonbelievers. Today's exemption debates concern matters like
religious employer coverage of contraception or prohibiting
discrimination against gays. 416 These are not obligations that most
nonbelievers would seek exclusion from in any event. And even if a
broad approach to religion were extended to institutions for purposes
of an analogy to the ministerial exception ratified in Hosanna-Tabor,
there are few institutions that would fit even the broadened approach
to religion described above. 417 The ACLU and the NRA, for
example, are still not religious, even under the approach of the
Vietnam draft cases because the grounds of their positions are
primarily policy commitments, rather than deep moral claims. 418
I can imagine an organization-let us say a radical environmental
group that practices a kind of pantheism or panentheism-that would
come within the Seeger approach to religion, but the truth is that
government regulation of the employment practices of such a group
would raise serious free exercise issues already, 419 even without
recourse to Seeger and the other draft cases.
So the discussion that follows is primarily a matter of a kind of
identity politics that sometimes plays out in legal settings rather than
resulting in a change in case outcomes. That is not insignificant,
however, since some of America's worst political problems root in
such identity claims.
If we revisit the debate between McConnell and Feldman, as
extended by Leiter, we see that the terms of that debate change under
416. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623-24 (1996); Catholic Charities of the Diocese
of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d. 459, 461-62 (2006).
417. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694,
706 (2012).
418. See supra text accompanying notes 314-17 (explaining the Court's broadening of the
Seeger test by its emphasis on the morals and ethics as grounds of religious belief).
419. See Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1033 (3d Cir. 1981) ("[U]nder certain
circumstances, a pantheistic-based philosophy might qualify for protection under the
[F]ree [E]xercise [C]lause.").
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the approach of the Vietnam draft cases. It no longer makes sense to
ask what is special about religious liberty, contrasting religion with
some non-specified, other realm. Religion and that other realm,
which Feldman denominated as wisdom or philosophy, but did not
define, 420 and which Leiter refers to as conscience,421 are now
regarded as overlapping religious commitments. Most such claims
are protected by the Free Exercise Clause and by any statutory
religious exemption that is enacted.
At a certain point in their debate, Feldman insisted that the
obligation that Antigone felt to bury her brother, in violation of the
policy of the state, raised a philosophical rather than a religious claim
and that this demonstrated that religion is not special in terms of
deserving protection. 422 From the standpoint of the draft cases,
however, Antigone's commitment is clearly religious and she is
automatically protected to the same extent as any other religious
claim of exemption would be.
So, in all of the current fights in law that revolve around special
treatment for religion, the Pro-Religion Equality Project treats some
nonbelievers as if they were religious in a traditional sense. This
treatment then invites believers and nonbelievers to see the
commonality of their commitments. This insight will hopefully
lower the temperature of legal disagreements between believers and
nonbelievers.
As I suggested in Part II above, there is an increasing divide today
in America between believers and nonbelievers. 423 I hope that this
divide is not something inevitable or inherent, but it is something
real. It is something that we should try to overcome.
The division that we see need not be fundamental. It might only be
a matter of political disagreements. One of the reasons that
nonbelievers are alienated from demands for religious exemptions is
that they disagree with the political thrust of the claimed
exemption. 424 In other words, many nonbelievers favor gay rights,
while some religious believers want exemptions from laws banning
discrimination against gays. 425 Supporters of the Vietnam War who
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.

See Feldman & McConnell, supra note 164.
LEITER, supra note 2, at 26.
Feldman & McConnell, supra note 164.
See discussion supra Part II.
See Laycock, Sex, Atheism, and the Free Exercise of Religion, supra note 128, at 42232.
See Michael Kent Curtis, A Unique Religious Exemption from Antidiscrimination
Laws in the Case of Gays? Putting the Call for Exemptions for Those Who
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thought that Seeger and Welsh really just opposed the war might
have felt similarly about religious exemptions. This kind of
disagreement is at least, in principle, capable of compromise and
might prove temporary.
But, the division between believers and nonbelievers might instead
be much deeper. The more dangerous division occurs when
nonbelievers see "religious liberty as a protection only for believers,"
as Laycock puts it. 426 That kind of division can perhaps be bridged
by a broader understanding of religion and of religious exemption
claims.
My approach to healing this division is to include the beliefs of
nonbelievers within the rubric of religion. That is how the draft cases
operate. My approach is quite different from the way others are
currently thinking about nonbelievers and religious liberty. For
example, one way people think about this issue is to ask whether
atheism is itself a religion. Michael McConnell is surely right when
he argues that the answer to this question must be no, because
nonbelief by itself does not generate moral obligations. 427 The one
exception to McConnell's observation-one he would accept428might be that discrimination against nonbelief itself would be
unconstitutional, as in a religious oath case such as Torcaso. 429 Even
a negative answer to a religious question, such as whether God exists,
is religious in the sense of protected by the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses. 430
Nelson Tebbe goes further than McConnell in bringing nortbelief
and belief together by pointing out that nonbelievers are starting to
develop more positive approaches to morality and human flourishing
that generate particular demands on conduct that could come into
conflict with the demands of the state. 431 Tebbe anticipates that
because of this trend, "it might soon make sense for religious

426.
427.
428.
429.
430.

431.

Discriminate Against Married or Marrying Gays in Context, 47 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 173, 176 (20 II); Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage, PEw RESEARCH
CENTER'S
RELIGION
&
PUB.
LIFE
PROJECT
(June
2013),
http://features.pewforum.org/same-sex-marriage-attitudes/slide3.php.
Lacycock, Sex, Atheism, and the Free Exercise ofReligion, supra note 128, at 422.
Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SuP. CT. REv. I, 10-11
(1985); see also Tebbe, supra note 225, at 1156.
McConnell, supra note 427, at 10 ("[E]ach person must be as free to disbelieve as he
is to believe.").
See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 489 (1961).
See Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, supra note 364, at 326 ('"[R]eligion' is any
set of answers to religious questions, including the negative and skeptical answers of
atheists, agnostics, and secularists.").
Tebbe, supra note 225, at 1157-58.
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freedom law to protect practices that are demanded by this form of
contemporary humanism in much the same way that it protects
familiar religious observances."432
But both McConnell and Tebbe are still utilizing terminology that
distinguishes belief from nonbelief in more than just a sociological or
self-identifying sense. If, instead of such labeling, we asked what
nonbelievers actually believe, as Laycock once did for different types
of religious believers,433 we might find a sense of "transcendent moral
obligation"434-a sense that what a person does is of infinite
significance in the universe and that, at least in that sense, persons are
called to practice a particular way of life. In other words, many
"believers" and "nonbelievers"-and now I have to use quotation
marks for these terms-believe the same kinds of things. 435
Up to this point, I have been discussing exclusively Free Exercise
issues. On the side of the Establishment Clause, the expansion of the
understanding of what is religious would seem to restrict the reach of
that clause rather than expanding it.436 But any such conclusion could
not be accepted. If religion is grounded in the objective reality of
values, then clearly the government may establish something that
would be considered religion for purposes of the Free Exercise
Clause-government may support it, speak in favor of it, and teach it
in its public schools-without establishing "religion" for purposes of
the Establishment Clause. That is, government would still be
permitted to broadly oppose relativism and nihilism under its

432.
433.
434.
435.

/d. at 1158.
Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, supra note 364, at 335.
!d. at 336.
Terminology is indeed awkward in this context. How can people be labeled
nonbelievers when the argument is being made that they have beliefs relevantly
similar to people traditionally regarded as religious? Maybe the terms should be
churchgoers and non-churchgoers.
436. That is, on the assumption that the word religion has the same meaning in the two
clauses. I reject this position, but the unitary definition approach has an excellent
pedigree. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 32 (1947) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting) ('"Religion' appears only once in the Amendment. But the word governs
two prohibitions and governs them alike. It does not have two meanings, one narrow
to forbid 'an establishment' and another, much broader, for securing 'the free exercise
thereof.' 'Thereof brings down 'religion' with its entire and exact content, no more
and no less, from the first into the second guaranty, so that Congress and now the
states are as broadly restricted concerning the one as they are regarding the other.").
The majority in Everson did not dispute this aspect of Rutledge's dissent. See id. at
3-28 (majority opinion).
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teaching and speaking powers. I have discussed these matters
elsewhere. 437
Others have previously noted that broad definitions of religion for
purposes of the Free Exercise Clause lead to a divergence in which
religion means something different for Establishment Clause
purposes. 438 But this need not be seen as weakening Establishment
Clause values because discrimination among religions is still
prohibited.
To illustrate how the anti-discrimination policy would work in the
establishment context, consider that if the word God were understood
along the lines suggested in Seeger, the debate over the permissibility
of the Pledge of Allegiance and the National Motto would be very
different. God would then be seen as, among other, more traditional,
understandings, the God above the God of theism rather than as only
a supernatural being separate from the natural world. With that broad
understanding, it would no longer be necessary to "disregard"
polytheists and even some monotheists, as Justice Scalia felt
compelled to do in McCreary County, 439 in order to uphold these
public acknowledgments of God.
Such persons would not
necessarily be excluded from belief in such a broadened God
concept.
A broader understanding of religion would also have the effect of
opening up the curriculum of the public schools. Not only could and
should such schools offer a curriculum in the formation of objective
values, but such a curriculum should expose students to a variety of
viewpoints now regarded as "religious" and therefore out of bounds.
It should be remembered that as part of the opening up of religion
that led to Seeger, the Court in Torcaso v. Watkins in 1961, which
invalidated a Maryland requirement of a belief in God to hold public
office, had already defined "secular humanism" as a nontheistic
religion. 440 And, as Douglas Laycock reminds us, the first Humanist

See LEDEWITZ, CHURCH, STATE, AND THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN SECULARISM, supra note
235, at 99, 118.
438. See Steven D. Collier, Comment, Beyond Seeger!Welsh: Redefining Religion Under
the Constitution, 31 Emory L.J. 973,991 (1982) ("A second major weakness of the
Seeger/Welsh definition is that ... a different definition apparently is required for the
Establishment Clause .... ").
439. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 893 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("With
respect to public acknowledgment of religious belief, it is entirely clear from our
Nation's historical practices that the Establishment Clause permits this disregard of
polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities, just as it permits the disregard of
devout atheists.").
440. 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.ll, 496 ( 1961 ).
437.
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Manifesto also presented humanism as a new religion. 441 Insofar as
that is the case, however, the result should not be to restrict the
teaching of humanism in the public schools, but to recognize when
humanism is being taught and to ensure that many points of view are
presented, including theistic ones. Currently, as many believers
object, such humanism is taught sub rosa, while efforts to engage that
worldview are excluded as religious.
This approach does not change everything-it does not support
challenges to the teaching of evolution, for example. Evolution in
and of itself is not religion even under an expanded defmition. The
fact that evolutionary theory may have the effect of discrediting some
interpretations of Genesis does not render the theory itself religious.
On the other hand, evolution can be taught, and sometimes is, as
support for what Charles Taylor calls "exclusive humanism."442 If
that is done, then the school is teaching a religion when it presents
such a perspective and must either stop doing so or must expand its
offerings to allow challenges to that worldview.
Aside from the effect for law of an expansive approach to religion,
what will happen politically and culturally if the religious and the
secular come to be understood differently from the way we tend to
understand them now? What would it mean for this society to see the
common ground between religious belief and some forms of what we
have regarded heretofore as nonbelief?
Once the common ground between believers and nonbelievers is
seen in a way that penetrates the culture, the divide between believers
and nonbelievers may recede. Once nonbelievers begin to ask what it
means to feel the weight of infinite significance, they may stop
speaking of "rationality" as the basis of life and they may cease to
regard believers as merely superstitious. It may even occur to
nonbelievers that words like God might include and describe many of
their own commitments. Once believers accept the moral realism of
non-churchgoers, they may reduce their insistence that atheism leads
to immorality. This is what I mean by the suggestion that the draft
cases can heal our culture war divisions.
There are a number of hints that this kind of recognition may be
occurring. One obvious example is the new book by New York
Times columnist Ross Douthat, Bad Religion: How We Became a
Nation of Heretics, 443 which argues that America is not a secular

441. Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, supra note 364, at 328.
442. CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 18-19 (2007).
443. Ross DOUTHAT, BAD RELIGION: How WE BECAME A NATION OF HERETICS (2012).
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country, but is instead still a Christian country but one with
increasingly unorthodox doctrines. 444 Douthat's analysis can help us
understand how so many persons not affiliated with religion can tell
pollsters that they believe in God and how so many persons who say
they do not believe in God believe in other forms of supernaturalism,
like angels. 445 In another example, without specifically mentioning
Douthat's book, Kate Blanchard and Rachel Ozanne recently-in
May, 2012-discussed the heretic versus atheist terminology in terms
of their own beliefs in the online magazine Religion Dispatches.446
Their discussion thoroughly dissolves any easy reference to belief
and nonbelief.
A somewhat earlier example, and one I have written about
before, 447 is Andre Comte-Sponville's book, The Little Book of
Atheist Spirituality. 448 Comte-Sponville, though an atheist, prays
because, quoting Simone Weil, "'Love and prayer are merely the
highest form of attention. "'449 There is no reason to distinguish
Comte-Sponville's beliefs from those of many believers and he freely
acknowledges his debt to the Christian tradition.
Another book published in spring 2012, Alain de Botton's Religion
for Atheists,450 also seeks a closer connection for nonbelievers to the
religious traditions. David Brooks wrote of de Botton that he "looks
around and sees a secular society denuded of high spiritual aspiration
and practical moral guidance.'"' 51 The traditional religions knew how
to elevate human life, a wisdom we nonbelievers increasingly lack.
Brooks makes fun of de Botton's suggestion of a quarterly Day of

444. !d. at 4.
445. See id.
446. Kate Blanchard, Coming Out as a Heretic, RELIGION DISPATCHES (May 10, 2012),
http://www .religiondispatches.org/archive/atheologies/5941 /coming_out_as_a_heretic
/;Rachel Ozanne, 'Heretics' or 'Atheists'? A Response, RELIGION DISPATCHES (May
23, 2012),
http://www.religiondispatches.org/archive/atheologies/6005/heretics_or_atheists_a_re
sponse.
447. See Ledewitz, Seeking 'Common Ground', supra note 232, at 82-84.
448. ANDRE COMTE-SPONVILLE, THE LITTLE BOOK OF ATHEIST SPIRITUALITY (Nancy
Huston trans., 2007).
449. !d. at x, 143.
450. ALAIN DE BOTfON, RELIGION FOR ATHEISTS: A NON-BELIEVER'S GUIDE TO THE USES
OF RELIGION (20 12).
451. David Brooks, Without Gods: Alain de Botton's 'Religion for Atheists', N.Y. TIMES,
Mar.
16,
2012
(book
review),
http://www .nytimes.com/20 12/03/ 18/books/review/alain-de-bottons-religion-foratheists.html?ref=bookreviews&_r=O.
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Atonement in a secular society,452 but that may be just the kind of
practical ceremonialism that nonbelievers need.
Another recent example of a closer connection between believers
and nonbelievers is a short essay by the well-known atheist Austin
Dacey in which he discusses the law of blasphemy related to his
book, The Future of Blasphemy. 453 Dacey makes the point that there
is symmetry between the commitments of the believer and those of
the nonbeliever:
From a moral perspective, there is an important
symmetry between the attitude of the believer who
reserves special reverence for a deity, saint, or
prophet, and the attitude of the secularist who asserts
that every person is equally holy. Neither of these
beliefs is uniquely deserving of being labeled a
spiritual commitment, relegating the other to mere
"'speech" against that commitment. 454
While Dacey is arguing a different point from mine here-Dacey is
arguing that atheists deserve protection as much as do religious
believers455-his premise is my thesis: that persons who do not
believe in God still dwell in a world, still speak the language, still
make commitments to and still are in relationship with, the sacred.
But probably the most significant example of movement of
nonbelievers into the neighborhood of religion is that of the late legal
philosopher Ronald Dworkin. In August, 2013, some months after
his death in February, Harvard University Press published his last
book, Religion Without God. 456 I have not yet read this book, but I
was able to read the first chapter, which was excerpted some months
before in the New York Review of Books. 457 Here Dworkin attempts
to delineate a religious viewpoint without invoking the

452. /d.
453. Austin Dacey, Sacrilege, in THE FUTURE OF BLASPHEMY: SPEAKING OF THE SACRED IN
AN AGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 16 (20 12).
454. Austin Dacey, 'Religious Freedom' for Atheists, RELIGION DISPATCHES (May 24,
2012),
http://www .re1igiondispatches.org/archive/atheologies/60 12/whose_b1asphemy_the_at
heist_case_for_%27religious_freedom%27/.
455. See id.
456. RONALD DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD (20 13).
457. Ronald Dworkin, Religion Without God, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, Apr. 4, 2013,
http://www .nybooks.com/articles/archives/20 13/apr/04/re1igion-without-god/.

80

University of Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 43

supernatural. 458 The result is very much along the lines set forth in
this article. The religious attitude insists that values are real and
fundamental-as real, says Dworkin, as trees or pain. 459 The
religious attitude does rest on faith, as Leiter says, but so do science
and mathematics, according to Dworkin. 460
At this point I have to ask, what is the problem? Why are we
divided? Once believers are seen as nonbelievers and nonbelievers as
believers, it will be easier for us to talk with each other. But this
recognition places a burden on persons not affiliated with traditional
religion. For, whereas many traditional believers really are willing to
admit that they are not genuinely believers-that is just akin to
admitting that we are all sinners-we secularists have been unwilling
to press our beliefs beyond insipid cliches about rationality. We
"nonbelievers" must begin to ask what it is we believe and affirm. In
a general sense, we affirm significance, objectivity and meaning. But
we have not yet made these general commitments definite. Insofar as
the Vietnam draft cases are willing to grant religious exemption to a
belief that "occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that
filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for
the exemption,"461 we now must begin to ask in a serious way, what
kind of nontheistic, nonreligious belief is parallel to a belief in the
orthodox God? In the sense that we secularists have never sought to
clarify our beliefs in a fundamental way, we have not yet really
begun to be secular.
IX.

CONCLUSION: WE HAVE NEVER BEEN SECULAR

I write this conclusion with obvious apologies to Bruno Latour's
book, We Have Never Been Modern. 462 Latour's point is that, for all
our vaunted modernity, in a sense we have never been modern in our
sensibilities or comportment. 463 Well, we have never been secular
either.
We have never been secular in two senses. On the one hand, we
live under the great shadow of the Christian experience. The
emptiness of our nonbelief has the shape of the traditional God,
which is why the New Atheists had no trouble attacking the concept
of God, which they felt they understood perfectly well. It is also why

458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.

/d.
/d.
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United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965).
BRUNO LATOUR, WE HAVE NEVER BEEN MODERN (Catherine Porter trans., 1993).
/d. at 46-47.
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this culture retains so much supernaturalism-vampire chronicles,464
God as the Chairman in the movie, The Adjustment Bureau,465 The
One in the Matrix movies, 466 and so forth. Of course, we also retain
the notion of enlightened humanism that we received from the
medieval Church.
But there is another sense in which we have never been secular.
Our secularism has manifested largely in an absence of religion. If
we ask for the positive meaning of secularism, or its foundations, we
get vagueness and indeterminacy. I have recently examined the
potential for meaning in the Establishment Clause context,467 and the
same is true here in the context of religious exemptions and the Free
Exercise Clause. There is a need for explicit affirmation of the
grounds of meaning that are available in a secular world.
The goal for secularism must be to be fully secular in both these
senses. Insofar as we borrow from Christianity, we should do so
consciously, so that we are not carrying forward habits we should be
breaking. In that way, we would not simply be living in the shadow
of the Church.
But we need to act consciously in all regards, not just in rejecting
the concept of the supernatural Creator God. We need to consciously
build a positive secular civilization. We who are not traditionally
religious need to commit to a meaningful way of life that is just as
exacting as are the demands of organized religion.
If we do this, I believe that secular civilization will not end up in
conflict with the Christian civilization that Pope Benedict had been
encouraging the Church to reinvigorate before he stepped down. 468 It
is false to think that there is much in Christian tradition that
secularism needs to reject. The antagonism that has been manifest is
either merely political-antagonism to certain political positions held
by some religious believers, but of course not by others-or is the
result of ignorance of the positive inheritance we receive from the
Church. The liberal tradition and the scientific tradition are either

464. I ANNE RICE, THE VAMPIRE CHRONICLES COLLECTION (2002).
465. See THE ADJUSTMENT BUREAU (Universal Pictures 20 II).
466. See THE MATRIX (Warner Bros. 1999); THE MATRIX RELOADED (Warner Bros. 2003);
THE MATRIX REVOLUTIONS (Warner Bros. 2003).
467. Bruce Ledewitz, Toward a Meaning-Full Establishment Clause Neutrality, 87 CHI.KENT L. REv. 725 (2012).
468. See David Kerr, Pope Challenges US Bishops to Revive Christian Culture, CATHOLIC
NEWS
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(June
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2012,
4:02
AM),
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direct achievements of Christianity or, if that is too strong, at least its
achievement in large part.
These considerations arise in the Free Exercise context as we ask
the question from Seeger about a belief that occupies a place parallel
to the orthodox belief in God. 469 I only intend in this paper to
tentatively suggest some directions in which that question can lead
secularists.
First, God is binding. God is not experienced as a choice. This is
why Paulsen argues that only monotheists are protected by the Free
Exercise Clause-because God really does "make commands of
loyalty and obedience that constrain human behavior."470 Laycock
understands this, which is why he points to the role that natural law
could play in the life of the religiously nonaffiliated. 471 The
foundations of such bindingness, however, in the absence of God, are
obviously in question. Nevertheless, as C.S. Lewis explained, the
most important commitment that the various wisdom traditions share
is not to God, but to the worldview that humans are a certain kind of
being and that the universe is a certain kind of thing to which we
must conform. 472 And this must be true not just in terms of policies,
but of personal morality-away from what David Brooks calls our
current moral "mediocrity."473
Second, and following that sense of obligation, there must be a
sense of consequence. This sense of consequence is known in
monotheism as God's judgment.474 I have not understood the strange
apathy about global warming in policy debate. Earlier generations
would have intuited God's judgment in the warming climate that
threatens human life, judgment for the greed that creates an economic
system that sacrifices the needs of the poor, and of most people, and
that ignores responsibility for God's good creation. Global warming
has the perfect shape of Biblical prophecy-if you do not do God's
will, the rains will not fall. Where is this witness today? Secularism
must be able to affirm that there are consequences for the failure to
obey the restrictions reality puts on us. Our out of control economic
development and globalization are simply the Tower of Babel.
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Third, God is a style. It is not an accident that all religions have
their ceremonies, holidays, rites and rituals. These all help form a
religious way of life. But what is the secular way of life? Even if
there are many possible forms of secular life, it must still be the case
that there are meaningful non-rational elements of beauty in secular
living. The plaintiffs in the Vietnam draft cases raised ethical issues
out of lives of meditative thoughtfulness. 475 That certainly is a kind
of style. But secularists in general have not been interested in how
secularists will actually live, beyond coming up with substitutes for
Christmas for the children of secularist parents.
Fourth, God is in community. Yes, the Supreme Court has held
that membership in a religious group is not a requirement for raising
a claim of religious exemption. 476 However, our concern here is not
law; our concern is secularism as a way of life. While a way of life
can be singular and idiosyncratic, at some point there must be a
reference to a community. In addition, the traditional religions have
a sense that the demands of the group have something to do with the
happiness and flourishing of humanity as a whole. That is another
aspect of community ignored by secularism up to this point
Finally, for purposes of this brief summary, God is comprehensive.
In the monotheistic traditions, there is not a separation between
personal morality and politics. These are all one. For example,
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam have long histories of teachings on
both ceremonialism and spiritual practices on the one hand, and
political life and economic organization on the other. The Vietnam
draft cases tended to forget this and asked only about beliefs
concerning war. But one belief by itself simply cannot be parallel to
the place of God in the life of the believer.
With this understanding of what it means to be religious, are we in
fact all religious? The answer is actually both yes and no for people
who call themselves religious and for people who call themselves
nonbelievers. There is a lot of functional atheism in the world and
much of it occurs in churches.
So, those people who see reality as an accident and human life as
meaningless are not truly religious in the sense of having beliefs
parallel to the orthodox belief in God. This is also true of anyone
who puts his own interests above those of others and of the planet.
Some of those people go to church quite regularly while others do
not.
475. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 335-38 (1970).
476. Frazee v. Ill. Dep't ofEmp't Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989).
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On the other hand, we who see reality as binding, consequential,
beautiful, communal, and comprehensive and who try to live out of
that understanding really are religious. Most of us, though like the
sinners we are, generally fail. Believers are not any better off in this
context than nonbelievers.

